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Intractable Delay and the Need To Amend the 
Petition Provisions of the FDCA 
DIANA R. H. WINTERS* 
Private party oversight has proven to be ineffective at countering inaction by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Inaction when regulation is warranted can 
put the public at continued and increasing risk of harm, but the failure of private 
enforcement to compel action reverberates beyond this harm to the interests of 
individuals. It also diminishes the transparency of agency decision making, lessens 
the opportunity for public participation, and reduces the interaction between the 
institutions that oversee agencies. Moreover, the benefits afforded to the 
administrative process by judicial review are weakened. 
This Article analyzes two examples of FDA inertia and compares private 
enforcement under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) to more successful 
private party activity under several environmental statutes. These comparisons 
highlight several weak spots in the FDCA that contribute to the difficulties faced by 
private party oversight in attempting to compel FDA action. The Article then 
proposes solutions suggested by these problems. Congress should amend the Act to 
include more specific petition provisions with statutory deadlines and to strengthen 
the general citizen petition provision of the FDCA. Interested parties should also be 
able to petition the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for the 
review of the denial of rulemakings. These steps will restore the vitality of a critical 
part of the administrative enforcement scheme—private party oversight—and 
thereby benefit both the public health and the regulatory state. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Inaction by federal agencies in the realms of health, safety, and environmental 
regulation causes as much or more harm than excessive action, or misdirected 
action.1 A failure to regulate when regulation is warranted puts the public at 
continued and increasing risk of harm. The administrative state relies on private 
enforcement to remedy deficiencies in agency action, including the problem of 
inaction. Agencies are also overseen by the executive branch and by Congress, but 
private enforcement provides a critical check on the influence of political vicissitude 
on an agency’s divergence from its statutory mandate.2 Moreover, congressional or 
presidential action addressing agency inertia is unreliable.3 
This Article is concerned with oversight of agency inaction and looks at why 
mechanisms of private enforcement are ineffective under certain circumstances but 
succeed under others. Agency inaction takes many forms, but the focus of this Article 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(“[D]elays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable 
when human health or welfare are at stake . . . .”). 
 2. The Administrative Procedure Act, which prescribes the structure of agency 
proceedings, emphasizes the oversight of private parties as the main constraint on agency 
action or inaction. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, It’s Time To Make the Administrative Procedure 
Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 101 (2003) (The Administrative Procedure Act’s 
basic provisions “rely on a single method for controlling the actions of administrative 
agencies, namely, participation by private parties.”). 
 3. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can’t Figure 
Out About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 28 (2009). 
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is not an agency’s failure to directly enforce its statutory mandates, over which it has 
much discretion, or the failure of an agency to engage in nondiscretionary duties, 
over which it has little. Instead I explore situations where an agency fails to respond 
to a rulemaking petition or denies a rulemaking petition. In particular, I look at the 
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) activities. By “ineffective,” I do not mean 
that the Agency has failed to act as a private entity desires, but rather that the Agency 
has failed to engage with or respond to the issues raised. The situations addressed 
here are evidence of a stalled system and a failure of the checks and balances built 
into the administrative state. 
More specifically, this Article analyzes the difficulty that private enforcement faces 
in forcing action by FDA.4 Inaction by FDA—which has responsibility over eighty to 
ninety percent of our food supply5 and authority over products that represent 
twenty-five cents of every consumer dollar6—imperils the public and decreases public 
confidence in our regulatory system more generally. In this Article, I look at two 
high-profile incidences of FDA inaction—the failure of FDA to withdraw approval for 
the subtherapeutic use of certain antibiotics in animal feed, and the Agency’s 
recalcitrance in switching emergency contraception to over-the-counter (OTC) status 
for all women. I will also examine two less prominent incidences of inaction.7 
In both the high-profile and less prominent incidences, private parties petitioned 
FDA to take a certain action, brought suit when FDA refused to do so, and in some 
cases, prevailed in court with a judicial opinion admonishing FDA for contravening 
its statutory mandate by not acting sooner. These cases can be seen as illustrations of 
private enforcement working as it should—stakeholders mobilized to enforce a 
federal agency’s tendency to stray from its statutory mandate and supported by 
judicial decree. But even if this is a system working properly, it is not a system 
working well. 
The cases are striking because of the immense delay. Especially in areas of health 
and safety regulation, FDA’s delay undermines regulatory goals and has a detrimental 
effect on the public health.8 Moreover, FDA’s inaction in these cases is an example of 
arbitrary decision making where “conclusions . . . do not follow logically from the 
evidence,” and this kind of decision making affects statutorily provided rights.9 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. By “private enforcement,” I mean agency-forcing suits, or suits brought by private 
entities against administrative agencies to force specific action. I am not addressing suits 
brought under citizen suit provisions, although these are discussed infra Part I.A., nor do I 
refer to suits brought under state tort law. 
 5. See RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22600, THE FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY 
SYSTEM: A PRIMER 4 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22600.pdf 
(basing this estimate on information supplied by the Government Accountability Office and 
the Department of Agriculture). 
 6. RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE BATTLE TO 
PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 24 (2010). 
 7. I do not look here at cases brought to accelerate the new drug approval process. This 
subset of agency inaction is governed by a distinct statutory scheme and is beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
 8. Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(“[D]elays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable 
when human health and welfare are at stake . . . .”). 
 9. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness 
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In contrast, there are certain areas where private enforcement has been very effective 
in forcing agencies to act pursuant to their statutory mandates. Private actors and judicial 
review have spurred action under the Clean Air Act (CAA)10 and the Clean Water Act 
(CWA),11 and have initiated the listing of many species under the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA).12 Although these suits have been subject to the delay inherent to judicial 
review, they have nevertheless resulted in some spectacular successes.13 
Why is oversight by private parties, one of the bedrock supports of the 
administrative state, effective in some contexts but not in others? Although each 
episode of inaction reflects a unique confluence of factors, specifically drawn citizen 
petition provisions, as are found in some environmental laws, allow for meaningful 
and (more) timely judicial review. In contrast, many citizen actions before FDA are 
brought under a weak general citizen petition provision. 
When it is clear that action should be taken, FDA delay undermines its statutorily 
mandated goals. For instance, there has been a consensus for over three decades that 
the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in animal feed harms the public health,14 and 
FDA, as the agency with responsibility over animal feed, should regulate the use of 
these medicines. Inaction and the failure of private enforcement also have 
implications beyond their specific substantive context. Episodes of arbitrary decision 
making resulting in inaction can, as Lisa Schultz Bressman writes, “affect individual 
liberty in a collective sense.”15 
Inaction is rarely documented, and the failure of private enforcement contributes 
to the opacity of agency decision-making processes. Public participation in the 
regulatory process is lessened, which is a detriment in itself,16 and reduced 
                                                                                                                 
 
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1687 (2004) (citing Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond 
Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
461, 496 (2002)). 
 10. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1764–72 (2011) (discussing serial litigation under the CAA). 
 11. See Robert L. Glicksman, The Value of Agency-Forcing Citizen Suits To Enforce 
Nondiscretionary Duties, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 353, 373 (2004) (discussing citizen suit 
litigation under the CWA). 
 12. See Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Petitions 
and Public Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321 (2010) 
(discussing success of citizen petitions under the ESA). 
 13. Private enforcement and judicial review do not always have a positive effect on the 
regulatory environment. For criticism, see Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of 
Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1331–36 (2014); Biber & Brosi, supra note 12, at 
323–24 (discussing criticism of citizen petitions). 
 14. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 872 F. Supp. 2d 318, 341–42 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (“For over thirty years, the Agency has been confronted with evidence of the human health 
risks associated with the widespread subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food-producing animals, 
and, despite a statutory mandate to ensure the safety of animal drugs, the Agency has done 
shockingly little to address these risks.”), rev’d on other grounds, 760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 15. Bressman, supra note 9, at 1687. 
 16. See David Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and Its Implications for 
Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 10 (2005) (“Proponents of 
increases in transparency and citizen participation in environmental or other aspects of 
governance internationally have invoked reasons similar to those offered by proponents of 
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participation also permits agency capture by special interests or at least the 
appearance thereof.17 Additionally, the failure of existing private enforcement 
mechanisms means the regulatory process does not receive the benefits provided by 
judicial review. 
In addition, if the oversight function of private enforcement is not working 
satisfactorily, the relationship between the agency and its various principals, which 
is already complex,18 becomes even more tangled. Without the effective oversight of 
the public and review by the judiciary, special-interest influence can thwart 
congressional will or block executive priorities, administrative pressure can interfere 
with legislative priorities, and/or legislative inertia can interfere with agency work to 
protect the public health and safety. 
This Article looks closely at these episodes of inaction by FDA and the failure of 
private oversight in forcing Agency action. It then offers some solutions suggested 
by the sources of the problem, although the complexity of the problem precludes a 
simple answer. Part I presents a typology of mechanisms for bringing suit against 
agencies to force action, and Part II looks at some specific instances of agency 
inaction in both the food and drug and environmental contexts. Part III discusses the 
problems resulting from the inadequacy of private enforcement to force agency 
action in these circumstances, and Part IV puts forward some solutions, including a 
call for Congress to write more specific standards for FDA to follow. 
I. SUING AGENCIES TO FORCE ACTION 
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) supports the architecture of the 
regulatory state by prescribing general procedural mechanisms with which all 
agencies must comply. Passed in 1946, one of the Act’s purposes was to “introduce 
greater uniformity of procedure and standardization of administrative practice among 
the diverse agencies.”19 In addition to the general provisions of the APA, agencies 
must comply with their specific implementing statutes. For example, FDA must 
follow the mandates of the FDCA but also ensure that its actions comply with the 
APA’s prescriptions. 
With regard to oversight by private parties, the APA permits citizens to petition 
agencies for rulemaking and provides for the judicial review of agency action.20 The 
FDCA also contains a general provision allowing private parties to petition the 
Agency for rulemaking, as well as specific provisions allowing for petitions under 
certain circumstances.21 This Part describes these rules, as well as an example of their 
                                                                                                                 
 
similar developments domestically, including increasing the fairness of the workings of 
international regimes; improving the information available to international decision-makers; 
enhancing prospects for compliance; and strengthening the legitimacy of the institutions 
involved.”); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1238 (1982) (describing the public values rationale for regulatory law). 
 17. See infra Part IV.B. 
 18. See STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 6, at 39–41. 
 19. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950). 
 20. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012). 
 21. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2012) (medical devices); id. § 360ss (radiation emissions); id. 
§ 379r (OTC drugs); id. § 379s (cosmetics). 
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counterpart in one of the major environmental statutes, the ESA, and explains how 
these provisions define the contours of the private enforcement of agency action. 
Next, it discusses the judicial review of agency inaction, which has a distinct and 
convoluted history. 
A. Provisions Permitting Citizens To Petition for Rulemaking 
The APA’s provision on rulemaking provides that agencies must allow any 
“interested person” the right to petition the agency for the “issuance, amendment, or 
repeal of a rule.”22 Agencies must provide “prompt notice” if they deny a petition, 
and this denial must be “accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds for denial” 
unless the agency is “affirming a prior denial” or “the denial is self-explanatory.”23 
The FDCA and various environmental statutes also contain petition provisions 
providing for interested parties to petition FDA, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), or any other relevant agency to take particular action. For example, 
a substance defined as a “food additive” can only be used in food after an interested 
party has petitioned FDA to issue a regulation prescribing the conditions under which 
the additive can be safely used.24 
FDA has issued regulations prescribing the procedures by which citizen 
petitions—petitions to the Agency requesting that the Agency take a certain action—
should be filed. For instance, any interested party can petition FDA to “establish, 
amend, or repeal a regulation” that prohibits a certain substance from use in human 
food.25 Any petitions submitted to FDA must comply with the requirements of the 
petition provision, 21 C.F.R. § 10.30, which also details procedures for FDA’s 
response. Under this provision, FDA must respond to any petition within 180 days, 
either denying the petition, approving the petition, or “[p]rovid[ing] a tentative 
response, indicating why the agency has been unable to reach a decision on the 
petition.”26 In issuing a ruling, FDA has much discretion and is instructed to take into 
account “available agency resources” and “the priority assigned to the petition 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e). For examples of parties petitioning agencies for the repeal or 
amendment of a final rule issued by the agency pursuant to notice and comment rulemaking, 
see Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 203 (2d Cir. 2004); S. Hills Health 
Sys. v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 1084, 1087 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 23. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2012). See Biber & Brosi, supra note 12, for a discussion of the 
APA’s requirement that agencies respond promptly to citizen petitions. They point out that the 
APA also requires an agency to “conclude a matter presented to it” within “a reasonable time,” 
5 U.S.C. § 555(b), and allows courts to “compel agency action ‘unreasonably delayed,’” Biber 
& Brosi, supra note 12, at 327 n.19 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)). 
 24. “Food additive” is defined as “any substance the intended use of which results or may 
reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component or 
otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food,” but excludes pesticide chemicals, color 
additives, animal drugs, dietary supplements, and foods generally recognized as safe. 21 
U.S.C. § 321(s) (2012). A petitioner must show that the food additive for which a regulation 
is requested is safe. Id. § 348(b). 
 25. 21 C.F.R. § 189.1(c) (2013). 
 26. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2) (2014). 
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considering both the category of subject matter involved and the overall work of the 
agency,” among other things.27 
Many environmental laws contain specific petition provisions too.28 The Toxic 
Substances Control Act allows “[a]ny person [to] petition the Administrator to 
initiate a proceeding for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule,” under various 
sections of the Act.29 The ESA details the procedures by which interested persons 
can petition the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce to add or 
remove a species from the endangered species list or the threatened species list.30 
Citizen petition provisions are different than citizen suit provisions, which many 
environmental statutes also contain. Citizen suit provisions generally allow any 
person or entity to sue a violator of the relevant statute or the agency in charge of the 
statute for failing to perform a nondiscretionary action.31 The FDCA does not contain 
a citizen suit provision or a private right of action.32 Without a citizen suit provision, 
a party may be unable to sue another private party for violation of the statute at issue, 
although a suit against the Agency is possible under the judicial review provisions of 
the APA. 
B. The Judicial Review of Agency Action 
Under the APA, “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy 
in a court [is] subject to judicial review,” and “[a] person suffering legal wrong 
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within 
the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”33 When 
reviewing agency action, courts can “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed” or “set aside” agency action found to be “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” among 
other things.34 In 1967, the Supreme Court stated a strong presumption in favor of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. Id. § 10.30(e)(1). 
 28. Congress enacted many petition provisions during the 1970s. See Biber & Brosi, 
supra note 12, at 327. 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 2620(a) (2012). 
 30. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3) (2012). The ESA is administered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service. 
 31. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012) (“[A]ny citizen may 
commence a civil action on his own behalf—(1) against any person . . . who is alleged to be 
in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued 
by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or (2) against the 
Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty 
under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.”); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7604 (2012) (citizen suit provision of the CAA). 
 32. Private parties can only sue violators if there is a private right of action or a citizen 
suit provision in the statute. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private 
Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 
93, 107–08 (2005). The FDCA does not contain a private right of action. See Bailey v. 
Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 33. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2012). The APA also contains exceptions to reviewability, 
explained infra Part I.C. See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2012). 
 34. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). 
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judicial review of agency action,35 and one commentator has noted that our society 
has a “deeply ingrained commitment to the availability of judicial review as a check 
on administrative action.”36 
The APA’s judicial review provisions apply in the absence of a specific statutory 
judicial review provision, which many statutes contain. Statutory judicial review 
provisions may designate which level of court should hear the claim, specify whether 
administrative exhaustion is necessary, or prescribe alternative methods of relief.37 Such 
provisions may also contain standards of review that differ from those of the APA. For 
example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 provides for judicial review 
of standards issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and 
it directs that “[t]he determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by 
substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole.”38 
Other statutes contain judicial review provisions as well, although some of these 
mirror the APA’s language. For example, the CAA provides that a court may reverse 
an agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law.”39 The FDCA “contains no single, overarching provision 
governing judicial review. Instead, discrete agency actions are subject to specialized 
review provisions,” which prescribe in which court (district or circuit court) appeals 
from Agency action will be heard.40 
C. The Judicial Review of Agency Inaction 
As one commentator noted, “[f]rom a cursory reading of the APA’s statutory text, 
it is not obvious that the APA would set a higher standard for judicial review of 
agency inaction than for review of agency action.”41 Indeed, the definition of “agency 
action” in the APA includes the “failure to act,”42 and the Act’s judicial review 
provision allows courts to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed,”43 in addition to reviewing agency action.  Action and inaction 
are reviewed differently, however. 
There are various types of agency inaction, and some are less susceptible to 
judicial review than others. “The notion of agency inaction might encompass any 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140–41 (1967), partially abrogated by 
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
 36. Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. 
L. REV. 689, 702 (1990). In The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, Bagley questions this 
commitment. See Bagley, supra note 13. 
 37. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (2012) (provision of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act providing for judicial review in the “court of appeals for the circuit in which the violation 
is alleged to have occurred or where the employer has its principal office, or in the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit”). 
 38. Id. § 655(f). 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (2012). 
 40. In re Natural Res. Def. Council, 645 F.3d 400, 404 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Cutler v. 
Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 887 (D.C.Cir.1987)). 
 41. Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 1, 8 (2008).  
 42. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012). 
 43. Id. § 706(1). 
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instance in which an agency fails to take desired or desirable action.”44 An agency 
may choose not to prosecute an alleged violator, may deny a citizen petition to initiate 
rulemaking,45 may fail to respond to a citizen petition calling for action,46 or may fail 
to comply with a specific statutory mandate or deadline.47 Each of these decisions 
not to act correlates differently with agency discretion and the extent of judicial 
review. Courts see the former as almost entirely discretionary and thus presumptively 
unreviewable, while the failure to respond to a mandate or meet a deadline is a failure 
to fulfill a nondiscretionary duty, which is more susceptible to judicial review. The 
courts treat each type of inaction along this spectrum with varying levels of 
deference, and I address each below. 
First, as noted, agency decisions not to prosecute specific violators or to take 
enforcement action against specific parties are treated as presumptively 
unreviewable.48 The APA contains two exceptions to the reviewability of agency 
action which exclude agency action from judicial review if “(1) statutes preclude 
judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.”49 In 
Heckler v. Chaney, a 1985 Supreme Court case involving a challenge by death row 
inmates to FDA’s decision not to prohibit the use of certain drugs to administer the 
death penalty, the Court held that section 701(a)(2) of the APA immunized “an 
agency’s decision not to take enforcement action” from judicial review.50 
In Heckler, the Court explained that such actions were unsuitable for judicial 
review for several reasons, including the following: 
First, an agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated 
balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its 
expertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation has 
occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this violation 
or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the 
particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall 
policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to 
undertake the action at all.51 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. Bressman, supra note 9, at 1664. 
 45. See Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as 
moot, 817 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 46. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 884 F. Supp. 2d 127 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(plaintiffs filed suit against FDA seeking to compel responses to citizen petitions filed years earlier). 
 47. See, e.g., Scott v. City of Hammond, Ind., 741 F.2d 992, 996 (7th Cir. 1984) (citizen 
suit brought against EPA for failing to promulgate waterway pollutant standards as required 
by statute); Sierra Club v. EPA, 850 F. Supp. 2d 300, 304 (D.D.C. 2012) (suit brought against 
EPA for failing to meet statutory deadline to promulgate certain emissions standards). 
 48. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). 
 49. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012). 
 50. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832. 
 51. Id. at 831. 
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Although courts have construed section 701(a)(2) narrowly,52 agency decisions 
not to take enforcement actions against violators remain unreviewable.53 On the other 
hand, judicial review is generally available for agency noncompliance with 
nondiscretionary duties. For example, the Food Safety and Modernization Act of 
2010 set mandatory deadlines for FDA to accomplish certain responsibilities, 
including promulgating several food safety regulations.54 FDA missed many of these 
deadlines, and two consumer advocacy groups, the Center for Food Safety and the 
Center for Environmental Health, sued FDA under section 702 of the APA to force 
compliance.55 Section 702 provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because 
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof,” and the APA’s 
definition of “agency action,” includes the failure to act.56 Plaintiffs argued that FDA 
had unreasonably delayed action by not promulgating the required regulations and 
the court should therefore compel action.57 
The district court agreed, explaining that courts can compel “discrete agency action” 
under section 706(1) of the APA when it is “demanded by law.”58 FDA argued that the 
reasonableness of its administrative timeline was the key factor in determining whether 
there had been “unreasonable delay” under section 706(1), and that the court should 
evaluate its timetable under the “TRAC test,” a six-factor balancing test set out by the 
D.C. Circuit in 1984.59 The court, however, held that noncompliance with the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of 
Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1338–39 & n.23 (2008); see also Kenney v. Glickman, 96 
F.3d 1118 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that the Secretary of Agriculture’s decision to inspect meat 
and poultry products differently was not a presumptively unreviewable enforcement action 
under Heckler); Public Citizen v. Heckler, 653 F. Supp. 1229 (D.D.C. 1986) (finding that a 
decision not to ban interstate sales of raw milk was not an enforcement decision committed to 
agency discretion). 
 53. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993) (“Over the years, we have read 
§ 701(a)(2) to preclude judicial review of certain categories of administrative decisions that 
courts traditionally have regarded as ‘committed to agency discretion.’ . . . In Heckler itself, 
we held an agency’s decision not to institute enforcement proceedings to be presumptively 
unreviewable under § 701(a)(2).” (citations omitted)); Bressman, supra note 9, at 1669. 
 54. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 350g(n)(1)(A) (2012) (“Not later than 18 months after January 4, 
2011, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations—(A) to establish science-based minimum 
standards for conducting a hazard analysis, documenting hazards, implementing preventive 
controls, and documenting the implementation of the preventive controls under this section . . . .”). 
 55. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, 
954 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. C 12-4529 PJH), available at http://
www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/2012-08-29-fsma-complaint-filed_78450.pdf. 
 56. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 702 (2012). 
 57. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra 
note 55. 
 58. Ctr. for Food Safety, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 968. 
 59. Id. at 969–70 & n.3 (“Under the TRAC test, the court should consider (1) whether the 
time agencies take to make decisions is governed by a ‘rule of reason’ that governs the 
analysis; (2) whether Congress provided a timetable in the statute; (3) whether the delays have 
more or less of an impact on human health and welfare (as opposed to simply having an impact 
in the area of economic regulation; (4) whether expediting agency action would have an effect 
on agency actions of a higher or competing priority; (5) the nature and extent of the interests 
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mandatory deadlines set by the statute required a finding of unreasonable delay and 
granted declaratory relief.60 After the parties were unable to come to an agreed-upon 
timetable, the court granted injunctive relief a few months later.61 
In short, an agency’s noncompliance with a mandatory statutory duty is 
reviewable and remediable.62 This is in marked contrast to the unreviewability of an 
agency’s failure to take enforcement action. Between these two poles, however, is 
the judicial review of an agency’s denial of a petition for rulemaking. 
In this situation, the agency is being urged to take action, and it refuses. For 
example, in 2010, the Corn Refiners Association petitioned FDA “to authorize ‘corn 
sugar’ as an alternate common or usual name for high fructose corn syrup.”63 FDA 
denied the petition.64 And in 1999, nineteen organizations filed a rulemaking petition 
with EPA requesting that EPA “regulate ‘greenhouse gas emissions from new motor 
vehicles under § 202 of the Clean Air Act.’”65 The denial of this petition was the 
basis for Massachusetts v. EPA,66 a case with implications for both the regulation of 
greenhouse gases and the judicial review of petitions for rulemaking. 
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court clarified that judicial review of the denial of 
rulemaking petitions is permitted, but highly deferential to the agency’s decision, 
explaining that “[t]here are key differences between a denial of a petition for 
rulemaking and an agency’s decision not to initiate an enforcement action” and that 
“[r]efusals to promulgate rules are thus susceptible to judicial review, though such 
review is ‘extremely limited’ and ‘highly deferential.’”67 
Although a court’s review of an agency’s decision on a rulemaking petition is 
highly deferential, its ability to assess the appropriateness of that decision is 
modulated by the statutory requirements of the provision under which the petition 
was made. Specific requirements create tangible markers to assess whether the 
agency has adhered to its duty. For example, under the ESA, any interested person 
                                                                                                                 
 
prejudiced by the delay; and (6) whether there is any impropriety ‘lurking behind agency 
lassitude’ (although such a finding is not essential to a determination that agency action has 
been unreasonably delayed).” (citing Telecomms. Res. & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 78, 80 
(D.C. Cir. 1984))). 
 60. Id. at 970. 
 61. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. C 12-4529 PJH (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2013). 
Pursuant to a settlement extending and staggering these deadlines, FDA dropped its appeal to 
the Ninth Circuit in February 2014. See Lydia Zuraw, FSMA Gets New Deadlines for Final 
Rules, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2014/02/fsma
-gets-new-deadlines-for-final-rules/#.UwgdAKCRjww. 
 62. See Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Badgley, 309 F.3d 1166, 1177 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(providing that if Congress provides a specific deadline, “no balancing of factors is required 
or permitted”). 
 63. Letter from Michael M. Landa, Director, Ctr. for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition, FDA, 
to Audrae Erickson, President, Corn Refiners Ass’n (May 30, 2012) (response to petition from Corn 
Refiners Association to authorize “corn sugar” as an alternate common or usual name for high 
fructose corn syrup (HFCS)), available at http://www.fda.gov/aboutFDA/CentersOffices
/OfficeofFoods/CFSAN/CFSANFOIAElectronicReadingRoom/ucm305226.htm. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510 (2007). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 527–28 (citations omitted). 
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can petition the relevant secretary to add a species to the endangered or threatened 
lists under the statute.68 After receiving the petition, the relevant agency must respond 
“[t]o the maximum extent practicable, within 90 days,” with a preliminary finding 
about whether further action is warranted.69 If further action is necessary, the agency 
must make findings regarding the petition within twelve months.70 A missed deadline 
provides the opportunity for an interested party to sue for action, and provides a court 
with delineated criteria on which to order action, even if such action is procedural.71 
Certain provisions of the FDCA work similarly. For example, in 1958, the Food 
Additives Amendment to the FDCA put into place a process whereby new 
ingredients had to be tested and approved before they could be used.72 Any person 
may file a petition with the Secretary of Health and Human Services to regulate the 
safe use of a food additive.73 The relevant statute prescribes specific information that 
the petition must contain, as well as specific deadlines for a response.74 If a party is 
seeking the repeal or amendment of a food additive regulation, it can file a food 
additive petition under 21 C.F.R. § 171.1. The petitioner is required to provide 
information on the changes, and FDA must follow the statutory deadlines for 
responding to a new additive petition.75 
Parties can also petition for a change to an existing food additive regulation using 
the citizen petition provision of the FDCA, 21 C.F.R. § 10.30.76 This route entails 
“far less supporting data than the food additive petition, and the petitioner does not 
bear the burden of establishing that an additive is safe or unsafe.”77 FDA is required 
to respond to a citizen petition within 180 days, but may file a “tentative response” 
explaining why it could not reach a decision.78 
There is also a specific petition provision within the Medical Device Amendments 
of 1976. Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 360g, “any person adversely affected by such 
regulation or order may file a petition with the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia or for the circuit wherein such person resides or has his principal 
place of business for judicial review of such regulation or order.”79 The provision 
includes a detailed list of the actions that may be challenged under this provision, 
including the denial of a request for reclassification of a device and the issuance of a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (2012). The ESA is administered by both the Department 
of the Interior and the Department of Commerce, and the relevant secretary depends on the 
species to be protected. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B). 
 71. See, e.g., Or. Natural Res. Council, Inc. v. Kantor, 99 F.3d 334 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(petitioner sued Secretary of Commerce for not responding to its petition to list coho salmon 
as an endangered or protected species in certain states). 
 72. The definition of “food additive” excludes many categories of ingredients, including 
ingredients approved before 1958. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2012). 
 73. Id. § 348(b)(1). 
 74. Id. § 348(b)(2), (c)(2). 
 75. 21 C.F.R. §§ 171.1(c), 171.100 (2013). 
 76. See supra Part I.A. 
 77. In re Natural Res. Def. Council, 645 F.3d 400, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 78. See supra Part I.A. 
 79. 21 U.S.C. § 360g(a) (2012). 
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regulation banning a device.80 If, however, a petitioner’s claim does not fall into one 
of the categories outlined in § 360g, she must file her claim in district court.81 
District courts may require petitioners challenging FDA inaction that does not fall 
within the requirements of a specific petition provision of the FDCA to first utilize 21 
C.F.R. § 10.30, the citizen petition provision.82 Courts, however, can waive this 
requirement because “the citizen petition procedure is a regulatory rather than a 
statutory creation.” In fact, courts have specifically waived this nonstatutory exhaustion 
requirement because of FDA delay in responding substantively to citizen petitions.83 
The availability of a statutory specific provision can provide petitioners and courts 
with specific benchmarks to gauge an agency’s response or a specific route to judicial 
review. When a challenged action or inaction falls outside of the bounds of these 
specific provisions, petitioners must use the APA’s unreasonable delay provision or 
a general citizen petition provision to bring suit, which provide courts with less 
concrete markers to review an agency’s performance. 
II. WHEN PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IS NOT ENOUGH 
This Part turns to cases where private enforcement has failed to effectively 
oversee FDA, an agency with vital importance to health and safety. In each of these 
cases, a private party sought action from FDA and moved, either by petitioning the 
Agency or by bringing suit, to compel action. And in each of these cases, the 
mechanism of private enforcement has not been effective in countering intolerable 
delay or arbitrary decision making. As noted above, this Article does not characterize 
private enforcement as having failed because the private party has not achieved the 
particular outcome sought. In fact, in several of these cases the particular outcome 
desired has been achieved, but after too much time has passed. Private party 
oversight is simply not effectively overcoming agency inertia. The Article then 
compares these episodes with areas where private enforcement has been extremely 
effective in compelling agency action. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. Id. § 360g(a)(3), (5). 
 81. See Moms Against Mercury v. FDA, 483 F.3d 824, 827 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“If judicial 
review of an FDA action or inaction is not provided for in the Act, challenges to such actions 
may be brought only in the district court.”). This case settled a year after petitioners were 
denied relief in the court of appeals when FDA acceded to their request and agreed to classify 
mercury fillings. 
 82. See, e.g., Cody Labs., Inc. v. Sebelius, 446 F. App’x 964, 970 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Cody 
argues that it will be unduly prejudiced if forced to exhaust because the FDA is sometimes 
dilatory in substantively responding to citizen petitions. . . . [But] [i]t is clear that Cody would 
not be unduly—or even significantly—prejudiced by following FDA regulations and filing a 
citizen petition.”). 
 83. See, e.g., Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Shalala, 963 F. Supp. 20, 30–31 (D.D.C. 1997) 
(“The FDA regulations require the agency to respond to a Citizen Petition within 180 days of 
its receipt, see 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2), in Bracco’s case, by the end of June 1997. The Court 
was advised during oral argument, however, that a ‘response’ might consist only of a letter 
advising a petitioner that the agency needs more time to consider the matter. Forcing plaintiffs 
to await the FDA’s response to their Citizen Petitions would permit the FDA to continue the 
disparate treatment of plaintiffs’ products that is causing them to spend millions of dollars in 
testing fees and costs.”). 
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A. Antibiotics in Animal Feed 
In 2011, after decades of inertia and delay by FDA, five consumer advocacy 
groups filed suit against FDA for failing to withdraw the approval of certain 
antibiotics used in animal feed for the purpose of increasing food production.84 
FDA approved new animal drug applications for penicillin and two kinds of 
tetracycline in the 1950s, after it was discovered that certain antibiotics improved 
food production when they were fed to animals at levels below those necessary to 
cure disease (subtherapeutic levels).85 In the mid-1960s, FDA began to consider 
whether the use of antibiotics in animals at subtherapeutic levels might lead to 
antibiotic resistance in organisms that cause human disease; and, in 1970, the Agency 
convened a task force consisting of scientists from FDA, the National Institutes of 
Health, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Centers for Disease Control, 
and representatives from academia and industry to study this and related issues.86 
In 1972, the FDA task force issued its report.87 It found that antibiotic-resistance 
prevalence has increased in humans; that the use of antibiotics, especially at 
subtherapeutic levels, leads to antibiotic-resistant organisms; that animals receiving 
antibiotics in feed may serve as reservoirs of antibiotic-resistant pathogens that can 
produce human infections; and that antibiotic-resistant organisms have been found 
on meat and meat products.88 
The task force recommended that antibiotics used as human medicine, including 
penicillin and tetracyclines, be prohibited from use in animal feed for subtherapeutic 
purposes.89 In 1973, FDA issued a regulation “propos[ing] to revoke currently 
approved subtherapeutic (increased rate of gain, disease prevention[,] etc.) uses in 
animal feed of antibiotic and sulfonamide drugs whether granted by approval of new 
animal drug applications, master files and/or antibiotic or food additive regulations, by 
no later than April 20, 1975,” and allowing for the submission of material by industry 
supporting the continued approval of these drugs along a specified timeline.90 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 884 F. Supp. 2d 127 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 85. Id. at 131; Eugene Lambert & Jeannie Perron, Veterinary Food and Drugs, in FOOD 
AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 247, 269 (David G. Adams et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011). 
 86. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 129. The other issues include whether 
antibiotic-resistant strains of organisms, if they were created by the use of subtherapeutic doses 
of antibiotics in animals, could be transferred from animals to humans, and whether a 
resistance “carrier” would affect other antibiotics besides those specifically used in animal 
feed. Lambert and Perron comment that these questions are “perhaps impossible to answer.” 
Lambert & Perron, supra note 85, at 274. 
 87. Antibiotic and Sulfonamide Drugs in Animal Feeds, 37 Fed. Reg. 2444–45 (proposed 
Feb. 1, 1972) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 135). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. At the same time, the Swann Committee in Great Britain came to similar 
conclusions, and restrictions were placed on antibiotic use in animal feed in England. Lambert 
& Perron, supra note 85, at 274. The Task Force noted that “[a]ntimicrobial agents used in 
human clinical medicine” that met certain safety guidelines in regard to growth promotion and 
subtherapeutic use could be used, but proposed shifting the burden to manufacturers to show 
the drugs’ safety and efficacy. Antibiotic and Sulfonamide Drugs in Animal Feeds, 37 Fed. 
Reg. at 2444–45. 
 90. 21 C.F.R. § 558.15 (2013). 
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The revocation did not take place, and in 1977, a subcommittee of FDA’s National 
Advisory Food and Drug Committee recommended the withdrawal of approval for 
the subtherapeutic use of penicillin and that restrictions be made on the 
subtherapeutic use of tetracyclines in animal feed.91 The Director of the Bureau of 
Veterinary Medicine, a subdivision of FDA, issued notices of an opportunity for a 
hearing (NOOHs) on the withdrawal of approvals for the subtherapeutic use of 
penicillin and certain tetracyclines.92 
A number of drug firms and agricultural groups requested hearings, and FDA 
issued a statement that “a notice of hearing will be published in the [Federal Register] 
as soon as practicable.”93 Subsequently, Congress made several statements 
requesting that FDA wait for more information before withdrawing these 
antibiotics,94 and FDA continued to research the risk of using subtherapeutic levels 
of antibiotics in animal feed.95 The hearings were not held. 
In 1983, FDA denied several petitions by industry requesting withdrawal of the 
1977 NOOHs proposing the withdrawal of approval for antibiotics in animal feed, 
but also began allowing the approval of new animal drug applications for the 
subtherapeutic use of penicillin and tetracyclines in animal feed.96 FDA concluded 
that new approvals should not be denied while its research was ongoing.97 
Fast forward two decades to when FDA published a notice proposing to rescind 
the sections in the Code of Federal Regulations from 1973 calling for the withdrawal 
of approval for the subtherapeutic use of penicillin and tetracyclines in animal feed.98 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. Penicillin-Containing Premixes; Opportunity for Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. 43,772 (Aug. 
30, 1977); Tetracycline (Chlortetracycline and Oxytetracycline)-Containing Premixes; 
Opportunity for Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. 56,264 (Oct. 21, 1977). 
 92. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 884 F. Supp. 2d 127, 134–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 93. Penicillin and Tetracycline in Animal Feeds, Notice of Hearing, 43 Fed. Reg. 
53,827–28 (Nov. 17, 1978). 
 94. The nature of these requests is unclear. The federal district court opinion states that 
“none of these recommendations was adopted by the full House or Senate, and none was 
passed as law,” Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 135, implying that FDA should 
have acted anyway, but a notice in the Federal Register states that the House Appropriations 
Committee has “mandated that FDA withhold any restriction on the use of penicillin and the 
tetracyclines (chlortetracycline and oxytetracycline) used in animal feeds until the National 
Academy of Sciences has studied the matter,” Committee To Study the Human–Heath [sic] 
Effects of Subtherapeutic Antibiotic Use in Animal Feeds; Public Meeting, 44 Fed. Reg. 
36,479 (June 22, 1979). Even if the congressional statements were binding, the information 
requested by Congress was not two decades in coming. FDA could have moved to acquire the 
necessary studies and to hold the hearings during the early 1980s. 
 95. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 136. 
 96. Drugs for Human Use; Drug Efficacy Study Implementation; Certain Anticholinergic 
Drugs Containing Tridihexethyl Chloride; Withdrawal of Approval, 48 Fed. Reg. 4554 (Feb. 
1, 1983); New Animal Drugs for Use in Animal Feeds; Penicillin and Tetracycline 
(Chlortetracycline and Oxytetracycline)-Containing Premixes, 48 Fed. Reg. 4490 (proposed 
Feb. 1, 1983) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 558). 
 97. New Animal Drugs for Use in Animal Feeds; Penicillin and Tetracycline 
(Chlortetracycline and Oxytetracycline)-Containing Premixes, 48 Fed. Reg. at 4490. 
 98. New Animal Drugs; Removal of Obsolete and Redundant Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 
47,272 (proposed Aug. 8, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 510, 558). 
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The notice explained that these sections should be removed because they “long ago 
fulfilled [their] stated purpose of requiring sponsors to submit data regarding the 
subtherapeutic use of antibiotics on the market at the time of its publication,” and 
because “over time FDA developed a new strategy and concept to deal with the issue 
of antimicrobial resistance.”99 
This 2003 notice is striking in two regards. First is its far-fetched justification for 
proposing the withdrawal of the sections calling for the withdrawal of approval for 
antibiotics in animal feed.100 It is clear from the face of the original call for hearings 
that its purpose was not information gathering, but rather the withdrawal of approval 
for antibiotics. The first sentence of the notice FDA proposed to withdraw is,  
The Commissioner of Food and Drugs will propose to revoke currently 
approved subtherapeutic (increased rate of gain, disease prevention[,] 
etc.) uses in animal feed of antibiotic and sulfonamide drugs . . . unless 
data are submitted which resolve conclusively the issues concerning their 
safety to man and animals and their effectiveness under specific criteria 
established by the Food and Drug Administration.101 
This leads to the second striking aspect of the notice, which is the description of 
the history of the “antimicrobial resistance issue” included by FDA.102 This history 
shows a consistent account of numerous studies, conducted over decades by various 
national and international bodies, finding that the subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in 
animal feed is dangerous to human health.103 
In 2010, FDA released a draft guidance titled “The Judicious Use of Medically 
Important Antimicrobial Drugs in Food-Producing Animals,” recommending that 
antibiotics used for human medicine not be used for growth promotion in 
animals104—the same recommendation FDA had made four decades earlier. 
In May 2011, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the Center for 
Science in the Public Interest, the Food Animal Concerns Trust, Public Citizen, and 
the Union of Concerned Scientists, Inc. brought suit against FDA, alleging that FDA 
had “withheld agency action,” and had therefore violated the FDCA and the APA.105 
Plaintiffs alleged that FDA had violated section 512 of the FDCA,106 which provides 
for the withdrawal of an approved animal drug if the drug is found to be unsafe, and 
that the court should “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed” under the authority granted by APA section 706(1).107 Furthermore, 
plaintiffs argued that the FDCA required the Agency to withdraw approval of 
penicillin and tetracyclines for subtherapeutic use in animal feed once it was found 
                                                                                                                 
 
 99. Id. at 47,274. 
 100. See id. 
 101. 21 C.F.R. § 558.15 (2013). 
 102. New Animal Drugs; Removal of Obsolete and Redundant Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 
47,272. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 884 F. Supp. 2d 127, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 105. Id. at 130. 
 106. 21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1) (2012). 
 107. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012). 
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that they had not been shown to be safe for humans, unless the drug sponsors could 
demonstrate the drugs’ safety.108 
In their complaint, plaintiffs also moved to compel responses to two citizen 
petitions they had filed in 1999 and 2005 requesting withdrawal of approval for these 
antibiotic uses, to which the Agency had never replied.109 During the suit, FDA 
issued denials to these petitions and plaintiffs amended their complaint to argue that 
the denials were arbitrary and capricious.110 
In response to the complaint, FDA argued that the FDCA’s provision on 
withdrawing approval for animal drugs111 only required the Agency to withdraw 
approval of an unsafe animal drug if the Secretary made a finding after a formal 
hearing.112 FDA did not, of course, hold the hearings for which it had given notice and 
did not, therefore, make those findings. It argued that it was not required to do either.113 
The district court disagreed with FDA’s interpretation of its statute, finding that 
the “plain meaning of § 360b(e)(1) requires the Secretary to issue notice and an 
opportunity for a hearing whenever he finds that a new animal drug is not shown to 
be safe.”114 The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs in March 
2012, finding that FDA must “re-issue a notice of the proposed withdrawals (which 
may be updated) and provide an opportunity for a hearing to the relevant drug 
                                                                                                                 
 
 108. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 140–41. 
 109. These petitions were most likely filed under the general citizen petition provision, 21 
C.F.R. § 10.30 (2014), as 21 U.S.C. § 360b (2012), the statutory section regarding new animal 
drugs, does not contain a petition provision for the withdrawal of animal drugs. 
 110. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 137 n.6; see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). 
 111. In relevant part, the provision reads:  
The Secretary shall, after due notice and opportunity for hearing to the 
applicant, issue an order withdrawing approval of an application filed pursuant to 
subsection (b) of this section with respect to any new animal drug if the Secretary 
finds— 
(A) that experience or scientific data show that such drug is unsafe for use 
under the conditions of use upon the basis of which the application was approved or 
the condition of use authorized under subsection (a)(4)(A) of this section . . . .  
21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1). 
 112. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 140–41. An article written by Lisa 
Heinzerling discusses FDA’s insistence on the need to hold a formal hearing, which she argues 
is unnecessary and anachronistic, and the Agency dysfunction that led to this position. Lisa 
Heinzerling, Undue Process at the FDA: Antibiotics, Animal Feed, and Agency Intransigence, 
37 VT. L. REV. 1017 (2013). 
 113. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 141. 
 114. Id. at 143. When a court reviews an agency’s interpretation of a statute, it “must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). If the court finds the language of the statute 
unambiguous, its inquiry stops there. If the intent of Congress is not clear, the “court will defer 
to an agency’s interpretation of the statute, so long as it is ‘reasonable.’” Natural Res. Def. 
Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 141 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44). Here, the court 
determined that the plain language of the statute was unambiguous, but even if it was not, 
FDA’s own regulations contradicted the stance that they were taking in the immediate 
litigation. Id. at 143–44. 
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sponsors . . . . If, at the hearing, the drug sponsors fail to show that the use of the 
drugs is safe, the Commissioner must issue a withdrawal order.”115 
As to plaintiffs’ claims that FDA’s denials of their 1999 and 2005 citizen petitions 
were arbitrary and capricious, the district court agreed in June 2012, granting 
plaintiffs summary judgment on this claim as well. The court wrote,  
[T]he Court finds the Agency’s denial of the Petitions to be arbitrary and 
capricious. For over thirty years, the Agency has been confronted with 
evidence of the human health risks associated with the widespread 
subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in food-producing animals, and, despite 
a statutory mandate to ensure the safety of animal drugs, the Agency has 
done shockingly little to address these risks. Now, in responding to this 
litigation and two Petitions that have been pending for years, requesting 
that the Agency comply with its statutory mandate, the Agency has 
refused to make any findings and instead intends to adopt a voluntary 
program that is outside the statutory regulatory scheme.116 
The case was appealed,117 and, in the interim, FDA announced a new voluntary 
plan to reduce the use of nontherapeutic antibiotics in animal feed.118 On July 24, 
2014, the Second Circuit overturned the district court’s decision. The Second Circuit 
was persuaded by FDA’s reasoning, holding that plaintiffs’ reasoning would have 
required FDA to make two findings, while the statute only called for one. The court 
also found this interpretation to be consistent with the provision’s statutory context 
and background legal concepts.119 
On September 18, 2014, President Barack Obama released an executive order 
titled “Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria.”120 The accompanying national 
strategy “recognizes that resistance can arise in humans, animals, and the 
environment.”121 One of its objectives is to “[e]liminate the use of medically 
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 151. FDA had withdrawn the NOOHs 
issued in 1977 for the withdrawal of the approval for antibiotics during the suit, arguing that 
the NOOHs were obsolete. Withdrawal of Notices of Opportunity for a Hearing; Penicillin 
and Tetracycline Used in Animal Feed, 76 Fed. Reg. 79,697 (Dec. 22, 2011). 
 116. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 872 F. Supp. 2d 318, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), 
rev’d, 760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 117. Natural Res. Def. Council v. FDA, 884 F. Supp. 2d 108 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 118. See Phasing Out Certain Antibiotic Use in Farm Animals, FDA (Dec. 11, 2013), 
http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/consumerupdates/ucm378100.htm. 
 119. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2014). The dissent 
points out that any reading of the provision in its larger context would show that once FDA 
had made a preliminary finding that the drugs were unsafe, it was required to hold hearings on 
their withdrawal. Id. at 177 (Katzmann, J., dissenting). The plaintiffs’ argument was the better 
one because the primary purpose of the FDCA is to protect the public, because the statute’s 
provisions regarding human drugs have always been construed to assume that withdrawal 
hearings would follow a preliminary finding, and because administrative practice comports 
with this sequence of events. Id. at 176–79. 
 120. Executive Order No. 13,676, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,931 (Sept. 18, 2014). 
 121. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING ANTIBIOTIC-RESISTANT 
BACTERIA 5 (2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/carb
_national_strategy.pdf. 
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important antibiotics for growth promotion in animals.”122 However, the strategy also 
relies on FDA’s voluntary programs to accomplish this in the United States.123 
B. Making Emergency Contraception Available to All Women over the Counter 
The decade-long saga concerning the provision of emergency contraception to 
women without a prescription, which included a public, and very controversial, 
dispute between the secretaries of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) and FDA,124 seems finally to be drawing to a close. In April 2013, a federal 
judge ordered FDA to “make levonorgestrel-based emergency contraceptives 
available without a prescription and without point-of-sale or age restrictions within 
thirty days,”125 and in June 2013, the government indicated to the court that it would 
comply with this order and would not appeal.126 On June 20, 2013, FDA approved 
the OTC sale of emergency contraception with no age restrictions.127 
Plan B One-Step is an emergency contraceptive that can be taken within 
seventy-two hours of sexual intercourse to prevent pregnancy.128 In 1999, FDA 
approved a new drug application (NDA) for Plan B, which became available by 
prescription.129 Before a new drug can be sold in the United States, the drug’s sponsor 
must submit an NDA to the Secretary of HHS.130 Each NDA is based on extensive 
clinical testing and must demonstrate the new drug’s safety and effectiveness.131 If a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. Id. at 8. 
 123. Id. 
 124. The dispute garnered much media attention and speculation regarding the political 
nature of the HHS Secretary’s action. See Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Overruled on Availability of 
After-Sex Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2011, at A1 (“For the first time ever, the Health and Human 
Services secretary publicly overruled the Food and Drug Administration . . . . The decision 
avoided what could have been a bruising political battle over parental control and contraception 
during a presidential election season.”); Rob Stein, Obama Administration Refuses To Relax Plan 
B Restrictions, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2011, at A1; Matthew Herper, Did the Obama 
Administration Throw the FDA Under the Bus?, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/matthewherper/2011/12/09/did-the-obama-administration-throw-the-fda-under-the-bus/. 
Incidentally, HHS previously overruled FDA in 1985. See infra Part III.C. 
 125. Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d. 162, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 126. Tummino v. Hamburg, No. 12–CV–763 (ERK)(VVP), 2013 WL 2631163, at *2 
(E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013). 
 127. Press Release, FDA, FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Emergency Contraceptive for Use 
Without a Prescription for All Women of Child-Bearing Potential (June 20, 2013), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm358082.htm. In March 
2014, FDA expanded access to emergency contraception over the counter with no age restrictions 
to generic contraceptive pills. Julie Rovner, FDA To Increase Access to Generic Morning-After 
Pills, NPR (Mar. 2, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2014/03/02/284397995/fda-to
-increase-access-to-generic-morning-after-pills. 
 128. Plan B works by preventing eggs from becoming fertilized, as opposed to RU-486, 
which acts on implanted embryos. See Pam Belluck, No Abortion Role Seen for Morning-After 
Pill, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012, at A1.  
 129. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 130. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012). 
 131. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2013). 
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drug “is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by 
law to administer such drug,” it must be categorized as a prescription drug.132 
It is not uncommon for a new drug to be approved as a prescription drug and then 
be considered for a switch to OTC status.133 A drug’s sponsor can request that a drug 
be switched from prescription to OTC status by supplementing its NDA, or FDA can 
promulgate a rule changing the drug’s status.134 Such a rulemaking can be initiated 
by a citizen petition or by FDA itself.135 A switch to nonprescription status is based 
on FDA’s finding that “the drug is safe and effective for use in self-medication as 
directed in proposed labeling.”136 
In early 2001, sixty-six petitioners filed a citizen petition with FDA requesting that 
FDA switch all emergency contraceptives from prescription to OTC status. FDA filed 
a “tentative response” to this petition pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e),137 but issued no 
final ruling on the petition for five more years, when the Agency denied the petition.138 
Between 2001 and 2006, however, FDA had been working with the sponsor of 
the Plan B NDA on its submission of a supplemental new drug application (SNDA), 
requesting that Plan B be switched to OTC status.139 
This application was submitted in 2003, and FDA denied it in 2004.140 The 
sponsor then submitted an amended application, requesting Plan B be made available 
OTC to women over the age of sixteen,141 which was amended again in 2006 to 
suggest OTC availability of Plan B to women over eighteen.142 This application was 
approved in August 2006.143 
In 2005, many of the original petitioners brought an action in district court seeking 
to compel FDA to respond to their citizen petition.144 FDA denied the petition in June 
2006, and the plaintiffs amended their suit to challenge FDA’s denial of their petition 
as arbitrary and capricious under the APA.145 The basis for this claim was the 
allegation that “FDA’s decisions were made in bad faith because they were 
improperly influenced by political considerations wholly outside the scope of the 
FDA’s statutory authority.”146 
                                                                                                                 
 
 132. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 133. Tummino, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 525. 
 134. 21 C.F.R. § 310.200(b) (2013). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Recall that a “tentative response” only means that FDA must give a reason for its 
failure to respond. This reason may be “the existence of other agency priorities,” among other 
things. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2)(iii) (2012). 
 138. Tummino, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
 139. Id. at 526–36. 
 140. Id. at 527–32. 
 141. Id. at 533. 
 142. Id. at 536. 
 143. Id. 
 144. The court noted that petitioners’ challenges to denials of citizen petitions are directly 
reviewable in district court because they were not covered under a specific FDCA petition 
provision providing for court of appeals jurisdiction. Id. at 539. 
 145. Id. at 538. Plaintiffs also filed constitutional challenges to the Agency’s denial of their 
petition. 
 146. Id. 
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In March 2009, the court agreed with plaintiffs, finding that plaintiffs “presented 
unrebutted evidence of the FDA’s lack of good faith regarding its decisions on the 
Plan B [OTC] switch applications.”147 The court remanded the case and directed 
FDA to reconsider its decisions regarding the switch of Plan B to OTC use.148 
The court’s conclusion that FDA had not acted in good faith was based on 
evidence of:  
(1) repeated and unreasonable delays, pressure emanating from the 
White House, and the obvious connection between the confirmation 
process of two FDA Commissioners and the timing of the FDA’s 
decisions; and (2) significant departures from the FDA’s normal 
procedures and policies in the review of the Plan B switch applications 
as compared to the review of other switch applications in the past 10 
years.149 
The evidence listed by the court to support its conclusions was extensive, and 
included (1) the fact that FDA’s scientific review staff and advisory committees 
recommended OTC availability of Plan B without age restrictions; (2) the evidence 
of White House pressure on FDA; (3) the arbitrary restriction of OTC availability to 
women over eighteen; (4) the inclusion of additional, unqualified members on an 
advisory committee; and (5) the refusal to extrapolate data in ways that had 
commonly been done in the past.150 
Notably, the court addressed concerns that remanding the issue to FDA would be 
futile. It commented that “circumstances have changed,” leading the court to believe that 
the Agency could be “trusted to conduct a fair assessment of the scientific evidence.”151 
FDA, however, did nothing. In 2011, plaintiffs in the original suit sought to hold 
the Agency in contempt of court.152 Simultaneously, the manufacturer of Plan B 
submitted an SNDA to FDA for permission to market Plan B as a nonprescription 
drug for all ages. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 147. Id. at 544. The court found the issue of FDA’s denial of the OTC switch applications 
to be “inextricably tied to its decision-making on the Citizen Petition.” Id. at 543. 
 148. The court remanded the issue of the Plan B OTC switch, but ordered FDA to allow 
women over the age of seventeen OTC access to Plan B under the same conditions that women 
over the age of eighteen were permitted access. The court found that here, “[a] remand would 
serve no purpose,” because  
[t]he record is clear: the FDA’s justification for the denial of OTC access to Plan 
B for women over the age of 17–rather than 18–“runs counter to the evidence” 
and “is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the 
product of agency expertise.”  
Id. at 549 (citations omitted). 
 149. Id. at 544. The decision in this case provides a detailed and fascinating account of the 
events leading to the lawsuit, and beyond. 
 150. Id. at 545–47. 
 151. Id. at 549. 
 152. Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Civil Contempt, Tummino v. Hamburg, 
2013 WL 865851 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013) (No. 05-CV-366 (ERK)(VVP)), 2011 WL 
7166996. 
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During oral argument of the contempt action, the Commissioner of FDA issued a 
statement with her opinion that Plan B should be approved as an OTC medication 
for women of all ages.153 Her opinion was based on research conducted by the Center 
for Drug Evaluation and Research, which “reviewed the totality of the data and 
agreed that it met the regulatory standard for a nonprescription drug and that Plan B 
One-Step should be approved for all females of child-bearing potential.”154 
The Commissioner also explained that the Secretary of HHS, who is responsible 
for executing the provisions of the FDCA,155 had directed her to disapprove the 
application.156 The Secretary of HHS issued her own memorandum, explaining that 
“the data submitted for this product do not establish that prescription dispensing 
requirements should be eliminated for all ages.”157 
In February 2012, plaintiffs to the original suit supplemented their complaint 
against FDA and HHS, thereby reopening the case,158 and in April 2013, the judge 
hearing the case granted plaintiffs’ petition and ordered FDA to make Plan B 
available without a prescription to all ages. Explaining why he would not remand the 
action to the Agency to begin a rulemaking proceeding, the judge stated,  
The FDA has engaged in intolerable delays in processing the petition. 
Indeed, it could accurately be described as an administrative agency 
filibuster. . . . The plaintiffs should not be forced to endure, nor should 
the agency’s misconduct be rewarded by, an exercise that permits the 
FDA to engage in further delay and obstruction.159 
Beyond the judge’s strong condemnation of FDA’s actions in this case, it is 
notable that in his decision he did not focus solely on the political ramifications of 
the case. Instead he noted, and emphasized, the mundane character of the nature of 
the case: 
[T]he issue in this case involves the interpretation of a general statutory 
and regulatory scheme relating to the approval of drugs for 
over-the-counter sale. The standards are the same for aspirin and for 
contraceptives. . . . [T]he standard for determining whether 
contraceptives or any other drug should be available over-the-counter 
                                                                                                                 
 
 153. Statement from FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg, M.D. on Plan B One-Step, 
FDA (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/ucm282805.htm [hereinafter 
Hamburg Statement]. 
 154. Id. 
 155. 21 U.S.C. § 393(d)(2) (2012). 
 156. Hamburg Statement, supra note 153. 
 157. Memorandum from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., to Margaret 
A. Hamburg, M.D., Comm’r of Food & Drugs (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://online.wsj.com
/public/resources/documents/20111207a.pdf. 
 158. Rachel Slajda, FDA Faces Renewed Battle over Plan B Age Restrictions, LAW360 (Feb. 
8, 2012, 2:50 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/307696/fda-faces-renewed-battle-over-plan
-b-age-restrictions; Tummino v. Hamburg (NY), CENTER FOR REPROD. RTS. (Aug. 13, 2013), 
http://reproductiverights.org/en/case/tummino-v-hamburg-ny. 
 159. Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d. 162, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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turns solely on the ability of the consumer to understand how to use the 
particular drug “safely and effectively.”160 
For this reason, the outcome of the case, according to the judge, depended on the 
judicial interpretation of the relevant statutory standards, which, according to the 
court, were clear.161 The case, however, took years to resolve.162 
C. A Historical Example: The Prohibition of the Interstate Sale of Raw Milk 
We see that FDA can delay responding to petitions brought under the FDCA’s 
general petition provision and that judicial review of this delay only takes place when 
a petitioner sues to force action. This is not a recent phenomenon. 
In 1973, pursuant to its authority to issue regulations regarding standards of quality 
for food,163 FDA promulgated a regulation prohibiting the sale of all unpasteurized milk 
products in interstate commerce.164 Due to questions regarding whether it was necessary 
to ban the interstate sales of certified raw milk to protect the public health, the Agency 
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. Id. at 169. 
 161. See id.  
 162. It is hard to generalize about the trajectory of emergency contraception from 
prescription to OTC status because of the politically fraught environment in which this 
decision was made. Concerns about the sexual activity of teenagers and the public’s 
uncertainty regarding how emergency contraception actually works influenced the 
conversation regarding the switch of the drug from prescription to OTC status and FDA’s 
convoluted handling of the matter. The uniqueness of the issue was illustrated by the way in 
which the Agency repeatedly and markedly diverged from its usual practices and policies in 
making the switch. See Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d. at 169 (FDA rode “roughshod 
over the policies and practices that it has consistently applied in considering applications for 
switches in drug status to over-the-counter availability.”); Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 
519, 544–49 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing improper political influence on FDA’s 
decision-making process and “significant departures from the FDA’s normal procedures and 
policies in the review of the Plan B switch applications as compared to the review of other 
switch applications in the past 10 years”). This case is still instructive, however. FDA used its 
“tentative response” tool to delay answering a citizen petition requesting the drug’s status shift, 
and it took almost a decade for the case to be heard by a court. Moreover, even after finding 
that FDA had diverged from its normal policies and procedures in 2009, which indicated a 
susceptibility to political pressure, the court remanded the case to the Agency for disposition, 
Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (remanding decision to Agency because different 
decision makers were in place and because this decision was “best left to the expertise of the 
FDA”), which reflected a culture of deference to FDA. Id. Courts usually remand to agencies 
instead of granting affirmative relief. Nevertheless, the court here recognized serious 
impropriety in the decision-making process by FDA, and for this reason it may have been 
expected to forego a remand. On courts’ historical deference to FDA, see DANIEL CARPENTER, 
REPUTATION AND POWER 361 (2010). 
 163. 21 U.S.C. § 341 (2012). 
 164. Public Citizen v. Heckler, 653 F. Supp. 1229, 1232 (D.D.C. 1986). 
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stayed the regulation.165 “Certified raw milk” is unpasteurized milk that satisfies 
standards established by the American Association of Medical Milk Commissions.166 
FDA collected information from 1974 to 1982, and in 1982 wrote a proposed 
regulation banning the interstate sale of all raw milk based on evidence that the 
consumption of raw milk was linked to bacterial disease.167 High-level officials at 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Centers for Disease 
Control supported this regulation, and statistical support was provided by the Chief 
of the Bureau of Foods Epidemiology and Clinical Toxicology Division in 1984.168 
The Agency, however, did not file the proposed regulations. 
Public Citizen, a consumer advocacy organization, filed a citizen petition with 
FDA in 1984, seeking a ban on the sale of raw milk, both interstate and intrastate.169 
FDA did not respond to the petition, but sent letters in response to follow-up 
correspondence from Public Citizen. These letters stated that the matter was being 
considered and that hearings would be held, but detailed no schedule for action.170 
Public Citizen then filed a lawsuit in district court requesting that the court order 
FDA to respond to its petition.171 
The district court ruled for Public Citizen, finding that “[t]he Department’s 
justification for its continued delay is lame at best and irresponsible at worst.”172 The 
court explained: 
The facts here speak for themselves and need little elaboration. Officials 
at the highest levels of the Department of Health and Human Services 
have concluded that certified raw milk poses a serious threat to the public 
health. Leading health organizations are unanimous in proposing that 
sales of any raw milk should be banned. The Food and Drug 
Administration has twice proposed, in 1973 and 1983, that all milk in 
interstate commerce be pasteurized. Hundreds of cases of serious 
gastrointestinal infections have been reported since the ban on raw milk 
sales was first proposed.173 
Under its authority given by the APA to “compel agency action . . . unreasonably 
delayed,”174 the court ordered FDA to rule on the petition within sixty days.175 
                                                                                                                 
 
 165. Milk and Cream, 38 Fed. Reg. 27,924 (Oct. 10, 1973) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 
18) (stayed by Identity Standards for Milk and Cream; Order Staying Certain Provisions, 39 
Fed. Reg. 42,351 (Dec. 5, 1974)). 
 166. See Public Citizen, 653 F. Supp. at 1232.  
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 1233. 
 169. Public Citizen v. Heckler, 602 F. Supp. 611, 612 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 613. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012). 
 175. Public Citizen, 602 F. Supp. at 614. 
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In response to the court’s ruling, FDA held hearings and, based on the findings 
from these hearings, recommended a proposed rule to the Secretary of HHS banning 
the interstate sale of raw milk.176 
The Secretary of HHS, however, rejected FDA’s recommendation and directed 
the Agency to deny the petition.177 While acknowledging the detrimental health 
effects of the consumption of raw milk, the Secretary reasoned that this was a matter 
better left to state control.178 
Public Citizen and other plaintiffs brought another action to challenge the denial 
of their petition, and in 1986, the court found the Secretary’s action to be arbitrary 
and capricious, and directed FDA to ban the interstate sale of raw milk.179 The court 
discussed the appropriateness of the judicial review of an agency’s decision not to 
engage in rulemaking, finding that the policy reasons underlying deference to such 
an agency decision were not present in this case.180 In particular, the decision did not 
implicate FDA’s budget, as FDA already regulated noncertified raw milk; there were 
no indications of competing policy considerations; and there was a full 
administrative record for the court to review, which eliminated the concern that the 
judicial review would be based on hypotheticals.181 
The court found that the Secretary’s explanation for the decision to ban the 
petition “runs counter to the voluminous evidence to the contrary she had before her 
. . . [and] has no rational connection to the undisputed facts in the record.”182 The 
court also found a remand to be unnecessary because the record itself was clear as to 
the scientific justification for banning interstate sales of raw milk.183 
The court in this case did not trace the decision by HHS to deny the citizen petition 
to any specific pressure from the administration, as did the court in the Plan B case. 
However, the availability and legality of raw milk has been tinged with controversy 
for decades.184 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. Public Citizen v. Heckler, 653 F. Supp. 1229, 1235 (D.D.C. 1986). 
 177. This is what happened during the Plan B decision making process, and it was viewed 
as shocking by commentators. See, e.g., Sam Baker, Left ‘Speechless’ as Sebelius Overrules 
FDA on Access to Morning-After Pill, HILL (D.C.), Dec. 8, 2011, at P1.   
 178. Public Citizen, 653 F. Supp. at 1240. 
 179. Id. at 1242. 
 180. Id. at 1239–40. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1240–41. 
 183. Id. at 1241. 
 184. See, e.g., Elena Conis, The Raw Milk Debate Rages On, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, at 
F3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/02/health/he-nutrition2; Dana Goodyear, 
Raw Deal, NEW YORKER, Apr. 30, 2012, at 32. The tenor of the debate regarding the ban on 
interstate sales of raw milk may have been influenced by a 1985 foodborne illness outbreak in 
California, which killed dozens of people. This outbreak was traced tentatively to raw milk 
used in cheese, although this finding was disputed. See Ronald L. Soble, Panel Blames Jalisco 
in Listerosis Cases, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1985, at A5; Sally Fallon Morell, Is Raw Milk Safe 
for Babies?, REAL MILK (Dec. 31, 2001), http://www.realmilk.com/safety/is-raw-milk-safe
-for-babies/ (tracing 1985 outbreak to pasteurized milk). Note that tracing mechanisms for 
foodborne illness outbreaks were undeveloped in the 1980s. 
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D. A Prospective Example: The Dispute over the Removal of 
Bisphenol A from Food Packaging 
In 2008, NRDC filed a citizen petition with FDA requesting that FDA revoke all 
regulations permitting the use of bisphenol A (BPA) in food packaging.185 BPA is a 
chemical that has been used in food packaging, including baby bottles, sippy cups, 
and formula containers, for decades.186 Humans are exposed to BPA when it leaches 
into food from packaging.187 
BPA has been the subject of controversy for several years. In 2008, after the National 
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences and the National Toxicology Program wrote 
a report calling for research into BPA’s potentially toxic effects, FDA began to study 
the chemical.188 The tests done by FDA scientists showed that humans did not retain 
BPA in their bodies, that it was passed by pregnant mothers to the fetus only minimally, 
and that there was no evidence of toxicity at low doses in rodent studies.189 
Numerous other studies, however, found BPA to have harmful effects, and FDA 
has been criticized for relying on only a small sample of industry-funded studies.190 
In the petition, NRDC wrote that rodent studies have shown BPA to have numerous 
harmful effects, which occur at levels of exposure found in the general public. The 
group pointed to research showing a correlation between BPA exposure and adverse 
effects on human health, and concluded that “[t]he weight of the scientific evidence 
now shows that human exposure to BPA can not [sic] be confirmed safe.”191 
NRDC petitioned FDA under section 409 of the FDCA, which regulates food 
additives,192 and under regulations issued by FDA regarding substances prohibited 
for use in human food. The group utilized the procedure for amending or repealing 
the standards approved for certain food additives and the procedure for submitting a 
citizen petition to FDA.193 
                                                                                                                 
 
 185. Natural Res. Def. Council, Citizen Petition 1 (Oct. 21, 2008), available at 
http://docs.nrdc.org/health/files/hea_08102001a.pdf. 
 186. Sabrina Tavernise, F.D.A. Makes It Official: Chemical Can’t Be Used in Baby Bottles 
and Cups, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2012, at A15. 
 187. FDA, FDA CONTINUES TO STUDY BPA (2012), available at http://www.fda.gov
/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm297954.htm. 
 188. Id.; Helena Bottemiller, FDA Denies Petition To Ban BPA in Food and Beverage 
Containers, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 31, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/03
/fda-denies-petition-to-ban-bpa-in-food-and-beverage-containers/#.VBuYzqC8_ww. 
 189. FDA CONTINUES TO STUDY BPA, supra note 187. A new study also shows that the 
chemical has little to no effect in the amounts that humans are exposed to. See Jon Hamilton, 
Maybe That BPA in Your Canned Food Isn’t So Bad After All, NPR (Feb. 26, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2014/02/26/283030949/government-studies-suggest-bpa
-exposure-from-food-isn-t-risky. 
 190. Lynn Harris, BPA: How Bad Is It?, BABBLE (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.babble.com
/baby/baby-health-safety/bpa-plastic-to-avoid-bispenol-a-safe-bottles/#fbConnectSection. 
 191. Natural Res. Def. Council, supra note 185, at 7–9. The harmful effects seen in rodent 
studies include “reproductive defects, chromosomal damage, nervous system harm, increased 
rates of breast and prostate cancer, and metabolic changes including obesity and insulin 
resistance.” Id. at 2. 
 192. 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2012). 
 193. 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.30, 171.30, 189.1 (2013); see also supra Part I.A. 
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FDA responded to NRDC’s petition with a “tentative response,”194 stating that it 
could not reach a final decision because of the “limited availability of resources and 
other agency priorities.”195 After more than a year passed, NRDC filed suit seeking 
to compel a denial or acceptance of its petition.196 In December 2011, NRDC and 
FDA settled. FDA agreed to make a decision whether to ban BPA from food 
packaging by March 31, 2012.197 
FDA denied NRDC’s petition on March 30, 2012. The Agency found that the 
studies used by NRDC were limited, and the information in the petition “was not 
sufficient to persuade FDA, at this time, to initiate rulemaking to prohibit the use of 
BPA in human food and food packaging.” FDA stated that it would continue to 
research BPA.198 
In July 2012, FDA banned the use of BPA in baby bottles and sippy cups. The 
Agency stated that it did not take this action in response to health concerns, but rather 
acted in response to a request by the chemical industry’s main trade association, 
which had already stopped using it in these products and was interested in boosting 
consumer confidence and reducing confusion.199 In July 2014, several legislators 
introduced a bill to ban BPA from food packaging.200 This bill, the Ban Poisonous 
Additives Act of 2014, failed in Congress.201 
                                                                                                                 
 
 194. This “tentative response” is permitted pursuant to the regulation issued by FDA regarding 
the procedure for submitting citizen petitions. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30; see also supra Part I.A. 
 195. In re Natural Res. Def. Council, 645 F.3d 400, 404 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 196. Id. at 400. NRDC initially filed suit in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals for 
an order directing FDA to respond to the petition. The court dismissed NRDC’s suit, finding 
that the district court had exclusive jurisdiction over citizen petitions. See id. NRDC then 
brought suit in district court. 
 197. Ross Anderson, FDA Agrees To Respond on BPA Risk by March 31, FOOD SAFETY 
NEWS (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/12/fda-agrees-to-respond-
on-bpa-risk-by-march-31/#.VBuZDqC8_ww. 
 198.  Letter from David H. Dorsey, Acting Assoc. Comm’r for Policy & Planning, Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., to Sarah Janssen & Aaron Colangelo, Natural Res. Def. Council 
(Mar. 30, 2012), available at http://docs.nrdc.org/health/files/hea_12033001a.pdf. 
 199. See Indirect Food Additives: Adhesives and Components of Coatings, 78 Fed. Reg. 
41,840 (July 12, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 175); Tavernise, supra note 186. 
 200. Chelsea Rice, Congress Considering Bill To Ban BPA from Food Packaging, 
BOSTON.COM (July 10, 2014, 1:54 PM), http://www.boston.com/health/2014/07/10/congress
-considering-bill-ban-bpa-from-food-packaging/JkXwdurEMLTkdpsENS30jJ/story.html. 
 201. H.R. 5033 (113th): Ban Poisonous Additives Act of 2014, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr5033. It is worth noting that a government study 
published in early 2014 showed that there was no effect on rats of ingesting thousands of times 
what humans eat. See K. Barry Delclos, Luísa Camacho, Sherry M. Lewis, Michelle M. 
Vanlandingham, John R. Latendresse, Greg R. Olson, Kelly J. Davis, Ralph E. Patton, 
Gonçalo Gamboa da Costa, Kellie A. Woodling, Matthew S. Bryant, Mani Chidambaram, 
Raul Trbojevich, Beth E. Juliar, Robert P. Felton & Brett T. Thorn, Toxicity Evaluation of 
Bisphenol A Administered by Gavage to Sprague Dawley Rats from Gestation Day 6 Through 
Postnatal Day 90, TOXICOLOGICAL SCI., Feb. 24, 2014, at 9, 21; Hamilton, supra note 189. 
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E. The Inadequacy of Private Enforcement 
In all of these examples, private parties petitioned FDA to take certain actions—
hold hearings on the safety of the subtherapeutic antibiotics in animal feed, revoke the 
approval for BPA in food packaging, switch Plan B to OTC status, and ban the sale of 
certified raw milk—and brought suit to compel a response to their petitions and/or to 
contest the Agency’s denials. In the contexts of animal antibiotics, the Plan B switch, 
and the ban on raw milk, FDA itself had publicly acknowledged that the actions the 
petitioners sought would benefit the public health, and in regard to BPA, FDA actually 
took one of the steps suggested by petitioners even after denying the petition. 
It may seem counterintuitive to characterize these cases as demonstrating the 
inadequacy of private enforcement when, in each, private entities achieved at least some 
measure of success. However, in each of these cases we see extensive delay, agency 
recalcitrance, evidence of arbitrary decision making, and repeated episodes of judicial 
review. These trajectories are unacceptable in the context of health and safety regulation.202 
In some areas where private enforcement is more successful in compelling agency 
action, such as in the promulgation of standards under the CWA, or the listing of 
species under the ESA, political and economic interests are also implicated. The 
difference, however, is that the statutes under which private parties successfully 
move to compel regulation have more clearly articulated criteria and requirements, 
and contain more deadlines for action. The greater precision of these statutes has 
encouraged more litigation in these contexts, as well as less judicial deference to the 
relevant agencies.203 
III. WHEN PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IS SUCCESSFUL 
This Part will describe two areas of law in the environmental context where 
private enforcement has been very effective in compelling agency action for the 
purpose of comparing the relevant statutory scheme to that used by citizens seeking 
to compel FDA action.204 
A. A Comparison with EPA’s Role in Setting Water Quality Standards 
Under the Clean Water Act 
The goal of the CWA is to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”205 The CWA declares that the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 202. See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(“[D]elays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable 
when human health and welfare are at stake . . . .”). 
 203. There are, of course, more reasons why there is more advocacy group litigation in 
the environmental context than the food and drug context. See Diana R. H. Winters, Not 
Sick Yet: Food-Safety-Impact Litigation and Barriers to Justiciability, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 
905, 916–29 (2012). 
 204. For additional discussions of the success of private enforcement in these contexts, see, 
e.g., Biber & Brosi, supra note 12; Glicksman, supra note 11, at 373–80 (TMDLs); Meazell, 
supra note 10, at 1774–80 (various cases).  
 205. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
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elimination of “the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters” is a national 
goal and the prohibition of “the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts” is a 
national policy.206 
Under the CWA, each state must identify bodies of water that are more polluted 
and thus require additional limitations on effluent and thermal discharges than are 
required under other parts of the statute.207 The state must then establish a “total 
maximum daily load” (TMDL) of EPA-identified pollutants for these waters.208 
States are required to submit the lists of waters and TMDLs to EPA for approval, and 
EPA then has to approve or disapprove each submission.209 The statute contains 
deadlines with which the states and EPA must comply.210 
After the passage of the CWA, many states did not meet their obligations to 
establish TMDLs, and EPA did not enforce the program.211 To enforce the program, 
environmental advocacy groups began to file lawsuits under the citizen suit provision 
of the CWA.212 Pursuant to this provision, “any citizen may commence a civil action 
on his own behalf,” against alleged violators of the CWA, and “against the 
Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any 
act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.”213 
Citizen suits to enforce the TMDL program were very successful. In Scott v. City of 
Hammond, Indiana, a citizen sued EPA for, among other things, its failure to set forth 
TMDLs for the discharge of pollutants into Lake Michigan.214 EPA argued that it could 
not do so because Indiana had not submitted its list of TMDLs, as was statutorily 
required.215 The Seventh Circuit held that the failure of the relevant states to submit 
TMDLs to EPA by the statutory deadline did not absolve EPA of its duty to promulgate 
TMDLs under the statute.216 The court reasoned that the absence of a state submission 
should be read as a “constructive submission” of no TMDLs.217 EPA could either 
approve this no-TMDL submission or disapprove it, in which case it was required to 
promulgate its own TMDLs.218 Either decision could be challenged in court. In his 
article on the value of agency-forcing citizen suits, Robert L. Glicksman notes that this 
                                                                                                                 
 
 206. Id. § 1251(a)(1), (3). 
 207. See id. § 1313(d)(1)(A), (B). 
 208. Id. § 1313(d)(1)(C); see also id. § 1314(a)(2). 
 209. Id. § 1313(d)(2). 
 210. Id. (providing that states have 180 days after EPA issues list of pollutants to submit 
list of bodies of water and TMDLs, and EPA has thirty days after this submission to respond). 
 211. Glicksman, supra note 11, at 374 (citing OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 51 (1999)). 
 212. Id. (“Against a background of federal environmental programs in which litigation has 
played a central role, it is hard to think of any program more precipitously driven by citizen suits 
from absolute zero toward its statutory destiny than TMDLs.” (quoting OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE 
CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 75 (1999)). 
 213. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012). 
 214. 741 F.2d 992, 996 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 215. Id. (“The district court agreed with the EPA that the EPA is not required to act unless 
and until the state submits a proposed TMDL.”). 
 216. Id. at 996–97. 
 217. Id. at 996. 
 218. Id. at 997. 
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“constructive submission” theory has been very influential, and that “TMDL citizen 
suits have already served as an important break on agency footdragging.”219 
Although the analogy is imperfect, we can compare FDA’s inaction in the field 
of animal antibiotics to EPA’s inaction in the context of promulgating TMDLs. In 
each case the agency did something that was supposed to lead to something else—in 
the case of antibiotics, FDA issued a notice for an opportunity for a hearing on the 
withdrawal of approval for certain antibiotics,220 and in the case of the TMDLs, EPA 
issued the statutorily required list of pollutants221—but did not take the subsequent 
action. Similarly, in each of the above-cited examples,222 members of the public 
attempted to compel FDA to act in an area implicating the public health, and each 
private party alleged that FDA had failed to take a statutorily mandated action. EPA 
was “footdragging” here in completing statutorily mandated steps toward the 
fulfillment of the statute’s ultimate purpose—the restoration and maintenance of the 
integrity of the nation’s waters.223 In contrast, though, the FDCA does not have a 
statement of purpose similar to that of the CWA. FDA’s stated purpose is to  
protect[] the public health by assuring the safety, effectiveness, quality, 
and security of human and veterinary drugs, vaccines and other 
biological products, and medical devices. The FDA is also responsible 
for the safety and security of most of our nation’s food supply, all 
cosmetics, dietary supplements and products that give off radiation,224  
but the FDCA contains no statement such as this. 
Moreover, the actions FDA was required to take in the examples are less clearly 
laid out than in the case of TMDLs. According to 21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1), the 
provision of the FDCA regarding the withdrawal of approval of an animal drug, the 
Secretary “shall, after due notice and opportunity for hearing to the applicant, issue 
an order withdrawing approval” of an animal drug if such drug was shown to be 
unsafe.225 Recall that FDA argued that it did not have to issue the withdrawal order 
if it never held a hearing and made findings pursuant to that hearing, regardless of 
any other findings it had made on the drug.226 
The provision of the CWA governing TMDLs, which requires EPA to approve or 
disapprove state submissions, is less open to interpretation by either the Agency or a 
court. It also contains specific deadlines, which are easily reviewable by a court and 
signal that Congress supported prompt Agency action in this context. The provision 
reads: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 219. Glicksman, supra note 11, at 374–75, 378. 
 220. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FDA, 884 F. Supp. 2d 127, 133–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 221. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(2)(D) (2012); Scott, 741 F.2d at 996 n.10 (“EPA finally made 
the necessary identifications on December 28, 1978, apparently under court order.”). 
 222. See supra Part II.A–D.  
 223. See supra notes 214–215 and accompanying text.  
 224. FDA Fundamentals, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics
/ucm192695.htm (last updated June 12, 2014).  
 225. 21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1) (2012). 
 226. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 140–41. 
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Each State shall submit to the Administrator from time to time, with the 
first such submission not later than one hundred and eighty days after the 
date of publication of the first identification of pollutants under section 
1314(a)(2)(D) of this title, for his approval the waters identified and the 
loads established under paragraphs (1)(A), (1)(B), (1)(C), and (1)(D) of 
this subsection. The Administrator shall either approve or disapprove 
such identification and load not later than thirty days after the date of 
submission. If the Administrator approves such identification and load, 
such State shall incorporate them into its current plan under subsection 
(e) of this section. If the Administrator disapproves such identification 
and load, he shall not later than thirty days after the date of such 
disapproval identify such waters in such State and establish such loads 
for such waters as he determines necessary to implement the water 
quality standards applicable to such waters . . . .227 
Granted, there is still ambiguity in the statute, as was litigated in the Seventh 
Circuit—that is, what happens if the state fails to submit its list for approval? 
Nevertheless, the existence of the deadlines better illustrates the wishes of Congress 
and better illuminates the Agency’s failure to fulfill these wishes than does a statute 
without deadlines. 
Unlike the CWA, the FDCA does not contain a citizen suit provision. Petitioners 
in the animal antibiotics suit (Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. FDA228) 
sued under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), which gives courts the power to “compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”229 As the court in Natural Resources 
Defense Council noted, “The Supreme Court has made clear that § 706(1) applies 
only when an [sic]‘an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required 
to take.’”230 In the animal antibiotics case, FDA contested both the “discrete action” 
prong and the “required to take” prong, arguing that because a hearing was a prolonged 
action, it was not a discrete action, and that it was not legally required to hold the 
withdrawal hearings in any event.231 Similarly, under a citizen suit provision, 
petitioners can only sue an agency for the failure to take nondiscretionary action.232 
Suits under either provision are therefore functionally the same.233 The real difference 
here is the lack of statutory deadlines. 
Even though the court disagreed with FDA’s arguments, the plaintiffs in Natural 
Resources Defense Council were more poorly equipped to force agency action than 
were those in the TMDL cases, where the statute contained deadlines. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 227. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 228. 884 F. Supp. 2d 127.  
 229. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1); see also supra Part II.A. 
 230. Natural Res. Def. Council, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 138 (emphasis omitted) (citing Norton 
v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)). 
 231. See supra Part II.A. 
 232. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012) (CWA citizen suit provision). 
 233. See Glicksman, supra note 11, at 369. 
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B. A Comparison with the Petition Provisions of the Endangered Species Act 
Citizen petitions have been very influential in shaping the trajectory of the ESA.234 
Any interested person can petition an agency for the issuance of a rule under the 
generic petition provision of the APA,235 and pursuant to this provision, any person 
can petition the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or the National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS) for a listing of a species as either endangered or threatened under 
the ESA.236 Under the ESA, the relevant agency then has ninety days to determine 
whether a filed petition should be investigated further, and then twelve months to 
determine whether the requested action is warranted.237 
These strict deadlines supplement the petition provision of the APA, which itself 
only imposes a duty on the agency to respond within a reasonable time.238 The 1979 
regulation,239 discussed above,240 detailing the procedure for the submission and 
receipt of citizen petitions to FDA, also supplements the APA’s petition provision. 
Like the ESA, this provision contains deadlines for FDA to respond to citizen 
petitions.241 However, this regulation allows FDA to respond with a “tentative 
response,” which must  
indicat[e] why the agency has been unable to reach a decision on the 
petition, e.g., because of the existence of other agency priorities, or a 
need for additional information. The tentative response may also indicate 
the likely ultimate agency response, and may specify when a final 
response may be furnished.242  
The “tentative response” mechanism was used by FDA in three out of four of the 
examples above243 and allows FDA to comply with its regulatory duty while not 
actually furnishing an answer to the petition. 
The strict deadlines in the ESA’s petition provision force FWS or NMFS to 
respond to a citizen petition. In contrast, FDA can respond tentatively, and thus parry 
the request. The deadlines give citizen advocates a specific, nondiscretionary duty 
that can be litigated if the agency fails to respond and allows a court to force action 
without imposing on agency discretion.244 Although these deadlines do not mean that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 234. See, e.g., Biber & Brosi, supra note 12, at 324 (looking at petitioning under the ESA 
to analyze how petitions and citizen suits affect environmental decision making). 
 235. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012); see also supra Part I.A. 
 236. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (2012). The FWS and the NMFS administer the ESA. 
 237. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(A)–(B). 
 238. See Biber & Brosi, supra note 12, at 327 n.19 (explaining that multiple provisions in 
the APA, read together, have been read by courts to require a timely response from agencies). 
 239. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2014). 
 240. See supra Part I.A. 
 241. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2) (“Except as provided in paragraph (e)(4) of this section, the 
Commissioner shall furnish a response to each petitioner within 180 days of receipt of the 
petition.”). 
 242. Id. § 10.30(e)(2)(iii). 
 243. See supra Part II.A–D.  
 244. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, No. C 06-04186 WHA, 2007 
WL 163244 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2007) (plaintiffs sued the FWS for not responding to their 
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a petitioner will receive the result sought, they do mean that the agency can be 
compelled to seriously consider the request. I do not mean to overstate the usefulness 
of the petition deadlines. Emily Hammond shows in her article on serial litigation 
that suits beginning as “straightforward deadline suit[s]” can last for decades with no 
discernible change in the status of the species at issue.245 Nevertheless, response 
deadlines are tools available for citizens seeking to compel agency action. 
IV. HOW THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT DETRIMENTALLY 
AFFECTS PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
The previous Part identified several episodes of FDA inaction that citizen 
participation could not effectively address. These episodes have effects that 
reverberate beyond their specific substantive impact. Although other institutions 
have influence over administrative agencies, the oversight of private parties is a 
crucial part of the administrative state, and its significance cannot be overstated. 
Indeed, one commentator has noted that the APA itself “is essentially a one-trick 
pony. All of its basic provisions rely on a single method for controlling the actions 
of administrative agencies, namely, participation by private parties.”246 
When private enforcement is ineffective, the transparency of agency decision 
making is diminished, the interaction between deliberative bodies is reduced, and the 
opportunity for public participation is lessened. In addition, any benefits of judicial 
review to the administrative process are tempered by the dysfunction of the private 
enforcement process. This Part discusses these harms, starting with the most direct 
effects of agency inaction. 
A. The Immediate Harm to Public Health 
When an agency fails to act, it adversely affects the intended beneficiaries of the 
relevant legislation.247 These adverse effects can implicate the structure of the 
administrative state, and thus can be relatively abstract, or can be tangible and 
immediate. With regard to FDA, the Agency’s failures can be enormously 
consequential, although they may be difficult to quantify. For example, FDA did not 
hold the hearings on the withdrawal of approval for the subtherapeutic use of certain 
antibiotics in animal feed that it called for in 1977.248 We are left with two questions: 
(1) Has new evidence shown “that such drug is not shown to be safe for use under 
the conditions of use upon the basis of which the application was approved” pursuant 
to the statutory provision outlining the procedure for withdrawing approval of an 
                                                                                                                 
 
petition that the Siskiyou Mountains salamander be listed as threatened or endangered under 
the ESA). 
 245. Meazell, supra note 10, at 1747–53 (discussing the flat-tailed horned lizard cases). 
 246. Rubin, supra note 2, at 101. 
 247. See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach 
Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1381, 1400 (2011) (discussing costs of agency delay). 
 248. See supra Part II.A. 
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animal drug?249 (2) If the answer to (1) is yes, and FDA had this information since 
the early 1970s (which seems to be the case) what is the effect on public health? 
Although the answer to (1) appears to be yes, and the court in Natural Resources 
Defense Council based its opinion on this finding,250 FDA disagreed and asserted 
that it had not made any such findings and that its consideration of the matter was 
ongoing.251 But even if the answer was clear, the effect of the continued use of these 
drugs is still uncertain. Numerous studies have shown some connection between the 
subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in animal feed and the growth of antibiotic-resistant 
germs with the potential to harm humans, but these conclusions are contested.252 
Difficult as it is to assess whether the public health has been harmed by FDA’s 
failure to regulate antibiotics in animal feed, it is even more difficult to quantify the 
effect of the Agency’s inaction with regard to switching emergency contraception from 
prescription to OTC status. Indeed, this calculation melds science, policy, and morals 
so completely that any such assessment is truly impossible. However, in Tummino v. 
Hamburg, the court extensively detailed the burdens on women seeking emergency 
contraception when such medicine could be obtained by prescription only.253 These 
burdens, coupled with FDA’s acknowledgement that the medicine “should be 
approved for all females of child-bearing potential,” led the court to the conclusion that 
the “FDA has engaged in intolerable delays in processing the petition.”254 
Although quantification of harm may be difficult, it goes without question that 
the effect of agency inaction can be far reaching. In fact, the repercussions of delay 
extend to the very structure of the administrative state. 
B. The Reduced Visibility of Agency Decision Making  
The APA’s procedural requirements are designed, in part, to ensure the 
transparency of agency decision making.255 The “administrative law values of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 249. 21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1)(B) (2012). 
 250. 884 F. Supp. 2d 127, 141, 149–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 251. Id. 
 252. See, e.g., Antibiotic Debate Overview, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline
/shows/meat/safe/overview.html (discussing controversy regarding feeding subtherapeutic 
doses of antibiotics to animals and possible risk to human health); Richard Knox, How Using 
Antibiotics in Animal Feed Creates Superbugs, NPR (Feb. 21, 2012, 11:10 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2012/02/21/147190101/how-using-antibiotics-in-animal
-feed-creates-superbugs (“A study in the journal mBio, published by the American Society for 
Microbiology, shows how an antibiotic-susceptible staph germ passed from humans into pigs, 
where it became resistant to the antibiotics tetracycline and methicillin. And then the antibiotic-
resistant staph learned to jump back into humans.”); cf. Richard Raymond, Antibiotics Used in 
Food-Producing Animals, MEATINGPLACE (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.meatingplace.com
/Industry/Blogs/Details/38770 (stating that most antibiotics used in food-producing animals are 
not used for human medicine). 
 253. 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 168–69 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 254. Id. at 167, 198. 
 255. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979) (“In enacting the APA, 
Congress made a judgment that notions of fairness and informed administrative 
decisionmaking require that agency decisions be made only after affording interested persons 
notice and an opportunity to comment.”). 
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participation, deliberation, and transparency . . . guard against arbitrariness and foster 
accountability.”256 Notice-and-comment rulemaking, the citizen petition provision, 
and the mechanisms for judicial review provide ways to allow regulated entities and 
beneficiaries access to the deliberative process and a means to challenge agency 
determinations. 
Transparency bolsters the legitimacy of agency decisions by, among other things, 
reducing the appearance that the agency has been “captured” by special interests. 
Administrative capture is a term for the phenomenon where regulated interests exert 
such an influence over their regulators that they essentially control the agencies, at 
the expense of the intended beneficiaries of the regulatory system.257 This 
relationship can be explicit, where there is an actual flow of individuals between 
industry and decision-making regulatory positions, or implicit, which involves more 
attenuated but no less real connections between decision makers and industry.258 And 
although regulatory beneficiaries may fear the synergy of agencies and their 
regulated objects, the term “capture” also encompasses the possibility that a regulator 
is so intertwined with the regulatory beneficiaries that it is no longer an effective 
regulating body.259 To address capture, judicial review can provide a degree of 
oversight that can root out and address unreasonable decision making affected by 
political considerations.260 
                                                                                                                 
 
 256. Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: 
Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 316 & n.18 (2013) 
(collecting sources on administrative law values). 
 257. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2, 8 n.32 (2010); 
William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling 
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1590–91 (2007) (“Agencies may be able to secure 
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result from more adversarial modes of regulatory exchange.”). 
 258. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1285 (2006). The question of whether agency capture is 
actually a problem, or more a perceived problem, and the effects thereof, has been amply 
discussed in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 
1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After 
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 183–84 (1992); see 
also Bagley & Revesz, supra, at 1284–92 (arguing that the theory of regulatory capture does 
not adequately explain the reality of governmental agency processes). 
 259. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 258, at 1286 (“[V]illains of this story are environmental 
groups like the Sierra Club, labor unions like the Teamsters, and consumer advocacy groups 
like Public Citizen, all of whom are driven by their narrow ideologies and heedless of any 
costs to American industries. Through their superior organizational mettle, these ostensibly 
‘public-serving’ groups prey on the sensibilities of warm-hearted but fuzzy-headed 
bureaucrats and congressmen to drive through regulations that are unnecessary, unwise, or 
simply too costly.”); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 1279 (“[O]ld fears of factional 
domination are now widely perceived to have been realized; broad legislative delegations have 
left agencies vulnerable to the sustained and organized political pressure of regulated firms, 
unions, and other powerful interest groups.”). 
 260. See Hammond & Markell, supra note 256, at 314 (“[T]he rigors of judicial scrutiny 
can further democratic accountability and otherwise incentivize legitimizing behaviors.”). 
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When the procedural mechanisms stop working smoothly, whether that happens 
because the agency refuses to respond to a petition,261 abuses the “tentative response” 
tool,262 or does not comply with a court order,263 public access to agency decision 
making is truncated, and the opportunities for review are lessened. For example, after 
calling for hearings on the withdrawal of approval for certain uses of certain 
antibiotics in animal feed in 1977, FDA continued to hold meetings on the issue 
through 1987.264 Between 1987 and 2003, however, when FDA proposed to 
withdraw the notice for a hearing, it appears that no open meetings on the issue were 
held although FDA was continuing to approve new subtherapeutic uses of antibiotics 
in animal feed during those years. 
C. The Lessened Value of Judicial Review 
The benefits of the judicial review of agency action are manifold.265 As Hammond 
and Markell note in their discussion of administrative legitimacy, “[a]t their core, the 
various principles of judicial review reinforce administrative law values of 
participation, deliberation, and transparency, which guard against arbitrariness and 
foster accountability.”266 The courts can increase the legality of administrative 
decision making by “ensur[ing] that regulatory agencies comply with congressional 
commands” and can foster the legitimacy of outcomes by protecting against arbitrary 
decisions and the excessive influence of interest groups.267 The judicial process itself 
is focused and accessible.268 And even divorced from its effect on outcomes, the 
participatory nature of judicial review is seen by some as “inherently valuable; 
citizen involvement in community self-determination is desirable without regard to 
notions of efficiency or private rights.”269 
Ineffective private enforcement, however, diminishes these benefits in two ways. 
First, if an agency can delay its response to a citizen petition, the issue does not reach 
the courts for years, if at all. This is what happened in Natural Resources Defense 
Council, the animal antibiotics case. Second, the lack of statutory tools that leads to 
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ineffective private enforcement also contributes to increased judicial deference to the 
agency, which can weaken some of the benefits of judicial review. 
There are multiple reasons why a case of agency inaction may not reach the courts 
for years, if at all. To begin with, there are high barriers to filing suit against an 
agency, including the need for expertise in the subject matter covered by the agency, 
knowledge of the regulatory process, and the resources to support prolonged 
litigation.270 Even groups skilled at bringing agency-forcing suits have priorities and 
agendas of their own, as well as a need to satisfy the diverse constituencies that make 
up their membership and financial support structure.271 
Once a party files a petition against an agency, it can bring a suit to challenge the 
agency’s determination or the agency’s failure to respond.272 However, the question 
of when a failure-to-respond suit is appropriate can be complicated by the filing of a 
tentative response, which provides no substantive consideration of the issue and no 
timeframe for disposition of the issue.273 For example, in the antibiotics in animal 
feed case, petitioners filed citizen petitions in 1999 and 2005 and did not sue for a 
response until 2011.274 In the emergency contraception case, petitioners filed their 
first petition in 2001 and did not receive a denial until 2006.275 Petitioners in the raw 
milk case first filed a petition in 1984, although the Agency had been delaying on the 
issue of an interstate ban since 1973.276 
When a case does come before a court, judicial deference may weaken the value 
of judicial review by reducing the intensity with which the court scrutinizes agency 
action.277 There is a tradition of strong judicial deference to FDA decisions,278 for 
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two reasons. First, because of the technical and scientific complexity of many FDA 
determinations, courts tend to defer to FDA’s expertise in its regulatory space.279 
Second, the FDCA itself, written at the turn of the twentieth century, lacks, in certain 
areas, the clearly articulated congressional goals and statutory deadlines found in the 
more modern environmental statutes.280 Courts are therefore left with few guideposts 
by which to judge agency action. 
V. SUPPLEMENTING THE TOOLS AVAILABLE TO PRIVATE LITIGANTS SEEKING TO 
COMPEL AGENCY ACTION 
The previous Parts have shown that private enforcement has failed under certain 
circumstances to ameliorate the problem of arbitrary decision making by FDA, 
resulting in Agency inaction. In this Part, I propose several incremental changes that 
will address this problem. First, Congress should amend the Act to include more 
specific petition provisions, including mandatory response deadlines and 
informational requirements to support judicial review. Second, the FDCA’s general 
citizen petition provision should be strengthened. And third, I reiterate and 
supplement the call made by Richard L. Revesz and Michael A. Livermore that 
private parties be able to petition the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) for review of denials of petitions for rulemaking.281 
A. Specific Petition Provisions 
The inclusion of specific petition provisions in the FDCA would help prevent 
Agency delay and give courts a basis on which to review Agency decision making, 
or lack thereof. For example, public awareness of the connection between animal 
drugs and human health has increased.282 If 21 U.S.C. § 360b, the provision of the 
FDCA dealing with new animal drugs, contained a specific petition provision 
regarding the withdrawal of an approved animal drug, it would be easier for private 
parties to force movement on these issues. Section 360b creates a precise system for 
applications for uses of new animal drugs, which include exact response deadlines 
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by FDA.283 It also discusses the withdrawal of approval, including on what such 
withdrawal shall be based and how the Agency will go about withdrawing 
approval.284 The statute does not, however, contain timeframes within which this 
process must occur, nor a specific petition provision providing judicial review to a 
petitioner. For this reason, a party moving to withdraw the approval of a new animal 
drug will move through the mechanisms of the FDCA’s general citizen petition 
provision and be subject to the weaknesses therein. 
Congress could also incorporate a “statutory hammer” to make such a provision 
more effective. Statutory hammers add a layer of consequence to a statutory deadline. 
For example, some statutes provide a deadline before which an agency must act and 
prescribe substantive standards that will go into effect if the deadline is not met.285 
The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act contained a different kind of hammer—it 
required the Agency to establish proposed regulations within twelve months, which 
became final if final regulations were not promulgated in the next twelve months.286 
It is relatively easy to imagine how the increased use of statutory deadlines 
coupled with hammers could improve the regulatory process where agency inaction 
is caused by political pressure. Congress could amend the Animal Drug Amendments 
to prescribe that if a use of an approved animal drug was shown to be a harmful 
contaminant,287 hearings on its withdrawal would need to be held within twelve 
months or the drug would be automatically banned from animal feed. Congress could 
direct that once a group such as the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research finds 
that the OTC sale of a drug would be safe and effective, a proposed regulation 
switching the drug to OTC status must be written within twelve months, and a final 
regulation issued within twenty-four months, unless new information is discovered 
during the notice-and-comment period. 
It is true that even when statutes are prescriptive, agency discretion remains. For 
example, if FDA was directed to hold hearings if an animal drug were found to be 
harmful to human health, the meaning of “harmful” would be contested. These 
determinations involve policy as well as scientific judgment.288 Deadlines can also 
improve timing at the expense of process.289 Nevertheless, the increased use of goal 
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statements and statutory deadlines would increase the incidence and effectiveness of 
private party oversight over agency inaction. 
B. Strengthening the Petition Provision of the FDCA 
Under 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e), the FDA Commissioner has 180 days to approve, 
deny, or furnish a “tentative response” to a citizen petition filed with the Agency.290 
The tentative response must “indicat[e] why the agency has been unable to reach a 
decision on the petition, e.g., because of the existence of other agency priorities, or 
a need for additional information,” and “may also indicate the likely ultimate agency 
response, and may specify when a final response may be furnished.”291 
The tentative response provision should be eliminated, or altered to include a 
deadline for the Agency to submit an approval or denial. The Agency should also be 
required to inform the petitioning party when it plans to submit a final response. 
Under the petition provision to bring a species within the purview of the ESA, the 
relevant agency (either FWS or NMFS) has ninety days after a petition is submitted 
to determine whether the petition contained such information as to suggest that 
further review was warranted.292 If the agency does move forward with review, it 
then has one year to decide whether to deny the petition, approve the petition, or 
decide that the petition is warranted but that a regulation implementing the final 
regulation cannot be promulgated immediately because of other pending proposals 
to add species to the endangered or threatened lists.293 Significantly, the provision 
states that if the agency finds that the petition should be granted but that a regulation 
cannot be promulgated immediately, the petition “shall be treated as a petition that is 
resubmitted to the Secretary . . . and that presents substantial scientific or commercial 
information that the petitioned action may be warranted.”294 This means that the 
twelve-month clock begins again, and a new deadline is placed on the agency to take 
action. These deadlines are a useful tool and should be expanded within the FDCA.295 
There are counterarguments to the increased use of statutory deadlines. In their 
discussion of administrative deadlines, Jacob E. Gersen and Anne Joseph O’Connell 
note the importance of such deadlines, explaining that because Congress is often 
reluctant to impose substantive guidelines on agencies for reasons of agency 
discretion and expertise, “the most obvious way of controlling agency behavior is to 
regulate either the method or the timing of agency decision making.”296 However, 
Gersen and O’Connell find that while deadlines “do quicken agency action, at least 
to some degree,” they also “produce policy resulting from systematically different 
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decision-making processes that are less intensive than the norm. Deadlines seem to 
trade timing against process, and possibly even quality.”297 
However, deadlines placed on the agency would provide private parties an 
important tool for compelling agency action. Parties are more likely to bring suit if a 
deadline is breached, and courts are better able to adjudicate such suits than those 
based on the merits.298 Because one of our concerns is that FDA has been able to 
escape any judicial scrutiny of its inaction, stricter deadlines would at least assist in 
bringing these issues before courts, which could then oversee the process. 
C. Permitting Petitions to OIRA for the Review of the Denial of Rulemaking 
In their book on the usefulness of cost-benefit analysis for the increased regulatory 
protection of health, safety, and the environment, Revesz and Livermore call for OIRA 
to take on an increased role in setting agency agendas.299 Revesz and Livermore believe 
that a petitioner should be able to appeal to OIRA if her petition for rulemaking is 
denied.300 If the petition is supported by credible cost-benefit analyses, “OIRA could then 
examine the cost-benefit analysis, and if there is a strong enough case for regulation, 
either mediate between the agency and the groups, or issue a finding of fact that the 
regulation is justified.”301 This suggestion has merit, and could be strengthened by 
permitting an appeal if the agency has issued a place-holding response, like FDA’s 
“tentative response,” pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e). 
OIRA was created in 1980 by the Paperwork Reduction Act,302 and the office was 
initially occupied with reviewing agencies’ information collection requests.303 Under 
President Reagan, however, the Office became, and remains, charged with the 
centralized review of regulation. President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291, 
which required agencies to prepare cost-benefit analyses for major rules and to send 
a copy of each proposed or final rule to OIRA before publication.304 The goals of 
centralized review during the Reagan era were twofold: (1) to coordinate the 
regulatory state and promote efficiency and cost effectiveness, and (2) to cut down 
on unnecessary (and overzealous) regulation.305 Critics have shown, however, that 
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OIRA’s main focus during the Reagan years was deregulation, and that the 
coordinating role of OIRA was deprioritized.306 
President Clinton replaced Executive Order 12,291 with Executive Order 12,866, 
which maintained the framework of executive review of regulatory decision making, 
but increased transparency and introduced certain considerations in rulemaking 
review that arguably reduced the body’s antiregulatory bias.307 President Obama 
reinstated Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866, after changes made to the Office during 
the administration of George W. Bush.308 
President Clinton’s innovations notwithstanding, critics argue that OIRA review 
is structured to be antiregulation.309 The Office is also criticized for its lack of 
neutrality—“the available evidence supports the view that the mix of participants 
active in the OIRA review process heavily favors industry”310—and for its political 
motives.311 It may seem counterintuitive to utilize OIRA to goad agency action, as it 
has often been viewed as antiregulatory by commentators. Indeed, as Sidney A. 
Shapiro has noted, “we do know that OIRA often intervenes to weaken proposed 
rules, and there is evidence that it almost always does so when it makes changes, at 
least when the changes involve significant rules.”312 
Nevertheless, OIRA is still situated in a unique position to coordinate and 
rationalize agency action.313 Revesz and Livermore suggest certain reforms that 
would improve OIRA’s ability to assist in calibrating agency action, and 
coordinating interagency activity. These include increasing the transparency of 
OIRA deliberation, shifting OIRA’s focus from curbing regulation to helping 
agencies prioritize agenda items, and emphasizing OIRA as a harmonizing body.314 
But even with no formal reform, reviewing denials of rulemaking petitions would 
serve OIRA’s current goals, in that the costs of agency inaction can easily outweigh 
the benefits and the goals of the agencies charged with protecting the health and 
safety of the public. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 306. See, e.g., id. at 1265. 
 307. See id. at 1266–67; Copeland, supra note 303, at 1271–72. 
 308.  Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
Q&A’s, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/OIRA_QsandAs. 
 309. E.g., Bagley & Revesz, supra note 258, at 1267–68. Bagley and Revesz argue that 
OIRA only reviews regulations to see if they are too stringent as opposed to too relaxed, that 
OIRA rarely if ever reviews decisions to deregulate, and that agency inaction is not 
scrutinized. These three factors bias the Office against regulation. 
 310. Id. at 1306. 
 311. Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB and the Politicization of Risk Assessment, 37 ENVTL. L. 
1083, 1095 (2007) (arguing that the Office tried to impose additional scientific procedures on 
agencies for the purpose of slowing down regulation, and that it tried “to bend the risk 
assessment process away from the protective stance that Congress has required”). 
 312. Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and 
Remediation, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 221, 240–41 (2012). 
 313. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 281, at 183 (stating OIRA is well placed to 
harmonize and coordinate agency functions given its original mission and present authority). 
 314. Id. at 171–83. 
2015] INTRACTABLE DELAY 1089 
 
CONCLUSION 
Two recent, high-profile incidents have demonstrated the importance of—but 
flaws in—the use of private party oversight to combat arbitrary inaction by FDA. 
Private enforcement has proven to be a weak counter to agency inertia in these and 
other circumstances, and it has been unable to avert the harm to the public health 
caused by this inaction. The failure of private party oversight reduces the 
transparency of agency decision making and diminishes the benefits of judicial 
review on the administrative process. 
By comparing private enforcement under the FDCA to more successful private 
party activity under various environmental statutes, this Article shows that there are 
several steps that Congress can take to address agency inaction by FDA. These steps 
could help to restore the vitality of private party oversight, which is an integral part 
of the administrative enforcement scheme and benefits the public health along with 
the regulatory state. 
  
